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Abstract 
  
 This thesis reviews both the history and current comparative landscape of the law 
of assault with a view to determining the optimal approach to be taken by Scots law in 
structuring its crime of assault. There is very little in the current literature offering either 
kind of review, and equally there has been very little analysis of the desirability of a single 
offence versus other methods of structuring assault or non-fatal offences against the person 
generally. These issues are therefore addressed in this paper, starting with an extensive 
examination of the legal history surrounding breaches of physical integrity from the 
seventeenth century right up to the present day. The development of a nominate crime of 
assault from a ius commune understanding of ‘injuries’ is considered, along with the slow 
evolution of intention as the culpability element in modern cases of assault. This analysis is 
then utilised to critically assess the rationality and efficiency of the current approach to 
assault. From here, a comparative analysis of culpability and harm is undertaken, involving 
an in-depth study of the English law approach to gradation of offences against the person 
based on harm, and the Model Penal Code approach to gradation through variation of 
conduct in the commission of the same offence. This thesis concludes that the current 
approach to culpability is the correct one, but argues that an approach which utilises the 
conduct element of offences, such as that of the Model Penal Code, can offer a more 
principled approach to assault in Scots law.  
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Introduction 
 
 The Scottish Crime and Justice Survey 2014/15 findings1 suggest that, where 
homicide is excluded, only four per cent of reported violent crime is not related to a charge 
of assault of some severity.2 These assaults ranged from “minor assault with no/negligible 
injury” (64 per cent) all the way to “serious assault” (four per cent).3 Assault is therefore an 
extremely common occurrence in the criminal justice system. Additionally, assault is a 
single offence at common law in Scotland, defined as an intentional attack against another 
person.4 Assault is understood in the context of the application of force, and thus the 
physical consequences are absent from the offence definition, being confined to part of the 
factual narrative.5  
 
As a result, assault has been described as “one of the most flexible terms”,6 capable 
of covering a range of conduct from threatening gestures that cause alarm in the victim,7 all 
the way to attacks which just fall short of causing death.8 Assaults can be aggravated in 
ways which seek to recognise factors increasing the seriousness of the assault, generally in 
respect of the injuries sustained or the special character of the victim.9 As assault is a 
common law offence, the penalties available to the court range from admonishment to life 
imprisonment.  
 
It is therefore important to ensure that a meaningful and principled approach is 
taken to determining culpability for violent crimes in Scotland, yet the above facts suggest 
that the Scottish approach is in danger of being over-encompassing. This has the potential 
to offend our understanding of crimes as being necessarily narrow and specific to 
accurately reflect the various types of wrongful conduct in society and likewise provide 
                                                 
1 The Scottish Government, Scottish Crime and Justice Survey 2014/15: Main Findings (March 2016). These 
numbers are based on face-to-face interviews with 11,500 people: p.10. 
2 Robbery made up the remaining four per cent: see ibid at p.18.  
3 Ibid.  
4 JHA Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland (5th edn, 1948), p.115; see also Lord 
Advocate's Reference (No. 2 of 1992) 1993 JC 43. 
5 J Chalmers, “Offences Against the Person” in The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, MD Dubber & T 
Hörnle (eds) (OUP, 2014) pp. 727-746 at 729. 
6 Per Lord Justice-Clerk Hope in Kennedy v Young (1854) 1 Irv. 533 at 539.  
7 Atkinson v HM Advocate 1987 SCCR 534. 
8 E.g. Kepple v HM Advocate 1936 SLT 294 (holding someone’s head underwater); Atkins v London Weekend 
Television Ltd 1978 JC 48 (blocking the air supply of patient in intensive care); and Williamson v HM 
Advocate 1984 SLT 200 (pouring petrol over someone then setting them alight). 
9 Gordon, Criminal Law of Scotland, Vol II (4th edn, 2016), paras.33.04-33.29.  
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certainty to members of society on the conditions for liability.10 Other approaches involve 
splitting offences against the person generally (including assault) into a hierarchy of 
offences, as is done in England; or alternatively utilising a single offence which can be 
committed in several different ways, often involving different degrees of culpability, as 
adopted in the Model Penal Code (hereafter MPC).11 
 
 The present thesis therefore seeks to provide a historical and comparative analysis 
of assault in Scots law to determine the optimum way for the Scottish legal system to 
approach structuring the law in this area. Chapters one to three provide an historical 
analysis of the law of assault, ranging from the time when the legal profession began to 
examine conditions of liability right up to the modern formulation. There is presently a gap 
in the current literature of any in-depth historical analysis of assault (and the offence’s 
predecessors) through time,12 and thus a historical analysis is worthwhile in its own right 
as a contribution to understanding legal history in Scotland.  
 
 This historical analysis shall help us understand how assault became what it is 
today, both in terms of structure and underlying rationale, and whether this approach is 
principled or would benefit from revision. Chapter one shall begin this exposition in the 
seventeenth century by analysing the works of Sir George Mackenzie, William Forbes and 
Sir Alexander Seton in relation to the piecemeal case law to understand how seventeenth 
century Scots law conceived of physical injuries and the protection of physical integrity 
generally. We shall look at the differences in terminology, and in particular how assault not 
being understood as a nominate crime at this early stage had an important role in the 
fragmented approach to how breaches of physical integrity were understood. The law in 
this area was as much concerned with reputation as it was with violence, owing to the 
heavy influence of Roman law and the concept of iniuria.  
 
 Chapter two then explores how this foundation developed, outlining the close 
relationship between defamation and minor physical injuries during the eighteenth century 
                                                 
10 A Ashworth & J Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, 2013), pp.62-65 (principle of maximum 
certainty), pp.67-69 (principle of strict construction), and pp.77-79 (principle of fair labelling). 
11 MPC, §211.1(1).  
12 The closest examples are John Blackie’s formidable works on rights in personality, which indirectly deal 
with assault owing to its historical closeness with defamation and other rights in personality: J Blackie, 
“Unity in Diversity: The History of Personality Rights in Scots Law” in N Whitty & R Zimmermann (eds), 
Rights in Personality in Scots Law (DUP, 2009) pp.31-146; J Blackie, “Defamation” in K Reid & R 
Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland, Vol 2 (2000) pp.633-707. These sources shall be 
considered in this thesis. Also see generally DM Walker, A Legal History of Scotland, Volumes IV-VII, 
(1996-2004).  
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and how this came to wane by the nineteenth century when assault as a nomen juris 
became prominent, ultimately forcing the two types of iniuria to follow different paths. 
Particular attention shall be paid to the ground-breaking work of Baron David Hume 
during this time, and what it can tell us about the development of assault, as it transformed 
from a crime of reputation to one of violence. Further, we shall examine how the Roman 
concept of stellionatus came to be integral to understanding assault as an attack, rather than 
just violent behaviour. It is during this period that aggravations become a prominent way of 
varying the severity of assaults, and this shall be considered in depth.  
 
 In chapter three we shall conclude our historical timeline with a summary of the 
law from the late nineteenth century to present day, with particular attention paid to the 
solidification of two prominent elements in our understanding of assault: culpability and 
harm. These elements are given effect to through the first explicit mentions of an intention 
culpability requirement for assault, and equally by the streamlining and hardening on the 
rules on aggravations, giving assault a rudimentary method for distinguishing attacks based 
on the harm caused.  
 
 Finally, the fourth chapter shall take these principles of culpability and harm and 
analyse them from a modern, comparative perspective. Limited space precludes an in-
depth analysis of multiple legal systems, but reference is made where appropriate. An 
examination of the culpability requirement in light of modern jurisdictions shall determine 
whether a focus on intention is still preferable for a modern approach to prohibiting 
physical injuries. The modern English hierarchical approach and proposals for reform shall 
be analysed in light if their focus on grading offences against the person through the 
resulting harm, to determine how Scots law should give recognition to this element, if at 
all. A brief discussion shall consider morality in the law in this context, and specifically 
how we can give appropriate substance to laws generally through the conduct definitions. 
Modes of commission shall then be considered more generally in relation to the MPC in 
America and how Scots law can utilise the concept of a single offence capable of multiple 
forms of commission to better give effect to the principles underlying the law of assault.  
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1. 1650 – 1750: Foundational Beginnings 
 
1.1 Justifying the Historical Approach 
 
 The two centuries leading up to 1750 were a tumultuous time for Scotland, with 
great political and (to a lesser extent) legal changes happening throughout. The Scottish 
Reformation of 1560 was still relatively fresh in the minds of men, and the Union of 
Crowns in 1603 meant that the King now sat in London, with Scottish government “carried 
out by his instruments rather than men representing Scottish feelings and interests”.13 
Scotland during this period was described by Cromwell as “a very ruined nation”,14 and, 
with the King down south, Scots law was being written with English interests in mind.15 
Many doubted the argument that Scotland was “equal sharers with those of England” when 
much of the legislation was designed to suit the English economy.16 
 
 In this regard it is all the more fascinating that Scotland should eventually develop 
a different structural approach to the law of assault as compared with its heavily influential 
(and much larger) sister nation, England.17 Tracing this historical development is 
unfortunately hindered by a lack of systematic law reporting and, assault being a common 
law crime, consulting the case law is where one might hope to develop an understanding of 
how the crime looked in the seventeenth century. However, despite a lack of recorded 
judgments, we do have the first-hand accounts of eminent practitioners of the time. The 
work of Sir George Mackenzie is particularly useful as his seminal work, Matters 
Criminal, was written during the post-Renaissance Pre-Enlightenment period when 
Scotland’s legal system had begun to find its feet.18  
 
                                                 
13 Sir George Mackenzie, The Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal (1678) (OF Robinson (ed) 
2012, Vol. 59, The Stair Society) at p.xx. (hereafter referred to as MC; all references made are to Part I, 
unless specifically stated otherwise). 
14 G Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII (1965, Edinburgh) at p.352; see generally from p.343. 
15 Indeed, there were complaints of Sheriffs being “English sojours” and Judges of the Supreme Court 
numbering “a few English”, see ibid at p.348. 
16 Ibid at p.351. 
17 “That Scots law survived at all as a separate system after the Union brought it into such close contact with 
England is, in itself, of course a minor miracle” - Lord Hope of Craighead, “The strange habits of the 
English” in HL MacQueen (ed), Miscellany Six by Various Authors (The Stair Society, 2009) pp.309-320 at 
p.313. Lord Hope states (ibid) that a convincing argument can be made for the strong tradition of Scots 
institutional writings being instrumental in preserving comprehensive accounts of Scots private law long 
before anything similar could be achieved for England. 
18 The 1680s saw the publication of Stair’s Institutions of the Law of Scotland as well as the foundation of the 
Library of the Faculty of Advocates (of which Mackenzie played an integral part). See supra n.1 at p.xxvi. 
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Mackenzie’s work offered the first real attempt by a scholar to examine the conditions of 
liability, how crimes differed from delicts, and how far dole or design were necessary; such 
issues were not considered before this time.19 Mackenzie’s work is not without its critics: 
Lord Cooper argues that Mackenzie’s failing as a jurist is that he relied too heavily upon 
the opinions of others rather than his own in his description of the law,20 and he has been 
accused of being “exceedingly inaccurate” by Lord Hailes.21 
 
 Fortunately, however, in this time-period there are other authors whose work can be 
used to corroborate Mackenzie’s account, helping to develop a more solid picture of the 
criminal legal landscape at the turn of the century and minimise the possibility of any 
inaccuracies. William Forbes is criticised as having merely carried out a ‘copying’ exercise 
in his Institutes of the Laws of Scotland,22 accused of failing to provide an original 
contribution to Mackenzie’s work.23 Of course with the benefit of hindsight we now know 
just how valuable having a second account of the legal landscape is, and despite claims of 
repetition (which are not completely unfounded), there are striking differences which help 
to illuminate those areas which Mackenzie gives either little or no detail, and Forbes’ 
Institutes offers a structured approach to the topic which just does not exist in Matters 
Criminal.24 Likewise, Alexander Bayne’s Institutions of the Criminal Law of Scotland25 
tends to be overlooked due to its slender size, but has a great deal to say on the topic of 
assault and injuries, helping to improve our understanding of this hugely important topic. 
Written as a student textbook, it is likely a good representation of the law in practice at that 
time. 
 
                                                 
19 DM Walker, A Legal History of Scotland, Volume IV (1996) at p.489. 
20 Lord Cooper, Selected Papers 1920-1955 (1957), at p.277. 
21 Trial of Deacon Brodie at p.129, available at: 
https://archive.org/stream/trialofdeaconbro00brod/trialofdeaconbro00brod_djvu.txt. 
22 William Forbes, The Institutes of the Law of Scotland (1730) (Edinburgh Legal Education Trust, 2012). 
Note must also be made of Forbes’ much larger and unpublished work, A Great Body of the Law of Scotland, 
a seven-volume manuscript which can be viewed online at the Glasgow University Library Special 
Collections website: http://www.forbes.gla.ac.uk/contents/. MacQueen, in his introduction to the 2012 reprint 
of the Institutes, tells us: “Forbes’ Institutes gives us, at least in part, a convenient way of seeing in advance 
and in brief what it is that we are likely to find when we turn to this enormous and as yet almost untapped 
resource.” Institutes (2012) at p.vi. 
23 Hume had stated that the only valuable work on the topic of criminal law was MC (1678), completely 
ignoring Forbes’ contribution: Baron David Hume, Commentaries (1797)(1986 Reprint with introduction) at 
p.iii. 
24 HL MacQueen, Institutes (2012) at p.xiii. 
25 Alexander Bayne, Institutions of the Criminal Law of Scotland. For the use of students who attend the 
lectures of Alexander Bayne, J.P. (1730). 
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 A little should also be said on the choice of the seventeenth century as a starting 
point, addressing the claim that Scots criminal law as a whole does not have a history,26 or 
indeed that it does have a history but that such history only begins in a meaningful sense in 
the modern period (i.e. late eighteenth to early nineteenth century).27 Of course, in one 
sense this is true – the concept of ‘criminal law’ and the idea of crime as an object to be 
regulated in and of itself did not emerge until a much later period.28 However, the content 
of these principles did not emerge from a vacuum; they were the direct result of fledgling 
jurisprudence heavily entrenched in the Roman legal tradition which we discover from the 
scattered cases and the practitioners who wrote about them. By discerning the origins of 
current principles, we can evaluate their relevance in our modern society. 
 
 Using the above sources we can therefore create a structured account of seventeenth 
century assault: determining how was it structured and in what ways offenders were 
punished. In the context of the structure employed, it will be of specific interest to learn: 
what constituted the crime then, as compared with now; and under what circumstances was 
an assault deemed to be aggravated in the modern sense, so that the charge and/or 
punishment were more severe? The purpose is to uncover the legal tradition of assault in 
Scots law and determine which underlying principles this area of law adheres to; we can 
then determine how appropriate the current law is, within an historical context. 
 
1.2 Translating the Terminology 
 
 Before examining the Renaissance (and consequently Enlightenment) period law, 
one must overcome the initial hurdle of aligning the two sets of laws for comparison. This 
is not a straightforward task for three reasons. First, nomenclature such as ‘assault’ and 
‘aggravations’ are often non-existent in seventeenth century texts; in early works the terms 
‘injury’ or ‘invasion’29 are used to denote an attack on a person; the former in a broad sense 
                                                 
26 JF Stephen, History of the Criminal Law (1883). 
27 L Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order (2016), at p.63ff.  
28 Indeed, and in fairness, this is the sense in which both Stephen and Farmer are concerned.  
29 See, for example, both Mackenzie and Forbes on the topic of deforcement (assaulting a sheriff officer (or 
equivalent) in execution of their duty): Mackenzie, MC, Title 26, 2; Forbes, Institutes, Part I, Book V, 
Chapter III, Title II. Note that Hume, Commentaries, Book I, Chapter IX is entitled “Of real injuries” but 
uses the term ‘assault’ throughout. Cf. A Bayne, op cit. who uses the term ‘assault’ only when discussing 
hamesucken, Title on Injuries, pp.182-186, paras. 9-12. These terms are described as the “sub-categories of 
bodily injury based on the nature of the impact on the body” and also include “hurting”, “wounding”, 
“effusion of blood” and “mutilation” according to J Blackie, “Unity in Diversity” at p.47. ‘Assault’ as a 
nominate crime emerged in the 19th century, in part as a result of English influence, ibid at p.52-3. 
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which extended to the character of the victim.30  Second, many offences which we would 
today label as aggravations of assault were, in the Renaissance period, treated as either 
separate offences, or parasitic to another crime. One cannot therefore simply read the title 
on injuries for each author and know what the totality of the law of assault at that time 
period was, and in fact to obtain a clearer picture one must analyse much of these writers’ 
criminal treatises. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, on a structural level it is difficult to align 
the seventeenth century understanding of aggravations with how we approach this concept 
in the modern era. In current law aggravations are understood as a way of recognising that 
certain circumstances which deviate from the standard commission of an offence can 
change the nature of the wrongful conduct.31 Offences which are aggravated often attract a 
harsher penalty to reflect this distinction. The idea of criminal offences being augmented 
by factual circumstances is recognised in the seventeenth century,32 but its treatment is 
unsatisfactory due to a lack of consensus between the authors as to what exactly is being 
discussed, and equally due to omissions and contradictions within their own works. The 
former problem is immediately apparent from each writer’s introduction to the topic. 
Mackenzie tells us: 
 
“The civil law… divides crimes in ordinary and extraordinary; extraordinary 
were those wherein the law had appointed no particular punishment, ordinary crimes 
were such as were punishable by a liquid pain, determined by the law”.33 
 
Thus for Mackenzie it is crimes which are to be regarded as being categorised as 
ordinary versus extraordinary. However, Forbes tells us: 
 
“Punishments inflicted after trial [i.e. those where the offender did not plead 
guilty] may be divided into ordinary, and extraordinary, or arbitrary punishments… 
Ordinary punishments are those expressly determined by law… Arbitrary punishments 
                                                 
30 Forbes, Institutes, Part I, Book IV, Chapter IX, I: “But the offence specially called an injury, is a malicious 
exposing one’s reputation or character in the world to contempt and shame”; and Bayne tells us that the law 
“extends its care and protection to our reputation and good name, as well as to our persons and estates” all of 
which are to be considered types of injuries, Institutions, at p.174.   
31 See Gordon, Criminal Law, paras. 33.04-33.29 generally. 
32 See for example Bayne’s treatment of Duels: “Homicide sometimes receives an aggravation from the 
manner of committing it”, Institutions, Title on Duels at p.103. 
33 Mackenzie, MC, Title 2, 2 (my emphasis added). 
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are those which are left to the discretion of the judge to determine, according to the 
cause or nature of the offence”.34 
 
Forbes therefore viewed crimes as being subject to different categories of 
punishment. Despite the inconsistencies, one can presume that both authors were making 
the point that offences either had a set punishment laid down in statute (i.e. ordinary), or 
would leave the punishment to the decision of the judge (extraordinary/arbitrary). This 
simple statement becomes confused, however, when one considers how each then 
approached the topic within the body of their work. Mackenzie, who made the distinction 
between ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ crimes, made no further reference to the concept in 
Matters Criminal. The only references to punishment thereafter are bare statements that a 
particular crime was subject to either capital or an ‘arbitrary punishment’, something 
which he curiously omits to define until his Institutions published six years later, and then 
only to tell us that crimes are either punished “capitally, by death or pecunially, by a certain 
fine; or arbitrarily at the discretion of the judge.”35  
 
Likewise, Forbes, who had spoken of extraordinary punishment, curiously speaks 
of extraordinary crimes, and even includes a title on ‘extraordinary injuries’ which stands 
in stark contrast to his earlier comments placing the terms ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ as 
categories of punishments.36 In order to help us understand this curious inclusion he tells 
us only that injuries are considered extraordinary with respect to the place where they are 
committed; and in regard of the persons offended.37 The ‘ordinary/extraordinary’ 
distinction therefore seems to unhelpfully refer both to the technical issue of whether the 
sentence of a crime has already been prescribed by law or requires judicial discretion, 
while simultaneously addressing the substantive issue of signifying those offences for 
which punishment can be made more severe. 
 
It is equally confusing because it introduces a distinction between injuries where no 
such distinction exists as far as Mackenzie is concerned. For example, in the context of real 
injuries, i.e. injuries committed through actions, on the one hand we have Mackenzie 
telling us that all real injuries were to be punished arbitrarily (and were therefore all 
                                                 
34 Forbes, Institutes, Part I, Book I, Chapter IV, §4 (my emphasis added), §4 [1.] and §4 [2.]. 
35 Mackenzie, Institutions of the Law of Scotland (2nd edn, 1688), Book IV, Title 4, p.392. 
36 Forbes, Institutes, Part I, Book IV, Chapter IX, Title II; see also Book I, Chapter VI, 2. 
37 Ibid. 
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extraordinary),38 while on the other Forbes tells us that some real injuries were 
extraordinary (punished arbitrarily) and others were not.39 This would at least make sense 
if Forbes had then listed a category of ‘ordinary injuries’ which attracted fixed penalties, 
but this is clearly not the case as he tells us that both real and written ‘ordinary’ injuries 
were punished arbitrarily.40 The title on extraordinary injuries is therefore a curious 
inclusion, especially given that the concept does not appear again in his work in relation to 
any other crime. It certainly appears short-sighted on the part of Forbes to use such 
terminology when it would clearly contradict the essence of the ordinary/extraordinary 
distinction. 
 
It is possible that the title on extraordinary injuries was an attempt to introduce a 
separate concept of ‘extraordinary’ which is directly comparable to modern day 
aggravations. Indeed, Forbes seems to suggest a distinction between the terms 
‘extraordinary’ and ‘arbitrary’. The initial statement, that “punishments… may be divided 
into ordinary, and extraordinary, or arbitrary punishment” may suggest a correlation of 
ordinary and extraordinary punishments with the use of ‘and’, and likewise isolation of 
arbitrary punishments as a separate entity (i.e. from extraordinary punishments) with the 
use of ‘or’. This is perhaps reaching, but becomes more credible when one considers the 
exposition which follows, detailing the different kinds of ordinary punishment, before 
curiously going on to discuss at great length the circumstances in which “[t]he ordinary 
legal punishments are aggravated”.41 This is important because it comes before, and 
consequently separately from, his discussion on arbitrary punishment, suggesting that the 
two are not synonymous.  
 
The list of circumstances where ordinary punishments were ‘aggravated’ is exactly 
what one would expect a list of modern day aggravations to look like: where the crime was 
“very hainous”; in respect of the place where the crime was committed; by the “character 
and quality of the person injured”; where the accused is a repeat offender; and finally (a 
perhaps less modern example) depending on the time of day.42 Having gone out of his way 
to create this distinction, Forbes then, in a rather brief fashion, provides an identical list of 
                                                 
38 Mackenzie, MC, Title 30, 4. 
39 Contrast Forbes Institutes, Part I, Book IV, Chapter IX, Title I (ordinary injuries) and Title II (extraordinary 
injuries). 
40 Forbes, Institutes, Part I, Book IV, Chapter IX, Title I, 7. 
41 Forbes, Institutes, Part I, Book I, Chapter IV, §4 [1.]. 
42 Ibid at pp.15-17. 
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circumstances that the judge should consider when passing sentence,43 a futile exercise if 
the two concepts are one and the same. There are therefore statements which could be 
interpreted as laying the foundations for a distinction to be drawn between the terms 
‘extraordinary’ and ‘arbitrary’. 
 
Bayne’s account confuses matters further. He notes that real injuries had to be 
‘atrocious’ to attract liability, outlining the conditions under which such injuries gained this 
status.44 Once again the listed factors appear very similar to those considered by a judge 
administering arbitrary punishment. Thus, whereas Forbes appeared to utilise these 
considerations to differentiate ordinary from extraordinary forms of real injury, Bayne 
treats these considerations as essential ingredients for liability. Put differently, under 
Forbes’ division of injuries, Bayne suggests that there were no ordinary real injuries at all.  
 
In contrast, and on the basis of his title on the division of crimes, Mackenzie’s 
stance appears relatively clear: beyond being ordinary versus extraordinary,45 crimes could 
either be capital or not capital,46 and those cases where the guilt was “very great” could be 
described as “atrocious”.47 Mackenzie therefore utilised an order based on atrociousness, 
moving from offences against God to those directly against the King or Commonwealth, 
followed by murder and sexual offences; essentially, capital crimes arranged in order of 
moral atrocity.48 However, despite the clear categorisations outlined at the beginning, at no 
point is the word ‘extraordinary’ used in the title on injuries, or in Matters Criminal 
generally.49 As aforementioned, Mackenzie neglects to tell us what the parameters of 
arbitrary punishment are, save for a note in his later work Institutions that arbitrary 
punishment cannot extend to the death penalty,50 leading Robinson to say that arbitrary 
punishment is “something less than death”.51  
 
                                                 
43 Ibid at §4 [2.]. 
44 Bayne, Institutions, p.180, para.8.  
45 As clearly defined in Title 2, 2 (see above).  
46 Mackenzie, MC, Title 2, 3. 
47 Ibid. at Title 2, 5. He makes no mention of conduct requiring a certain degree of atrociousness.  
48 OF Robinson, “Law, Morality and Sir George Mackenzie” in HL MacQueen (ed), Miscellany Six (Stair 
Society, 2009) pp.11-27 at p.14; J Cairns, “John Millar’s lectures on Scots criminal law” (1988) 8 OJLS 364 
at p.381 broadly seems to agree.  
49 Mackenzie, MC, Title 30. Reference is exclusively made to ‘arbitrary punishment’ throughout. 
50 Mackenzie, Institutions of the Law of Scotland (2nd edn, 1688) at Book IV, Title 4 (p.400). 
51 OF Robinson, supra fn.46 at p.13. 
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Thus, the picture we are left with is one where aggravations to offences did not 
exist,52 save for those circumstances where conduct we would deem forms of aggravated 
assault are treated in their own right (e.g. attacking someone in their home) or as part of a 
separate crime (e.g. robbery). This account is mitigated by the inclusion, in the second 
edition of Matters Criminal, of an appendix by Sir Alexander Seton on the topic of 
Mutilation and Demembration. There he states that: 
 
“Arbitrary punishment answers to arbitrary crimes. All crimes are divided in 
ordinary… such as leasemajesty, homicide, and other capital crimes; and extraordinary, 
or arbitrary; in which the law hath determined neither, but has left both, to the 
arbitriment of the judge… as matters of fact are more numerous than could be foreseen 
or comprehended in laws… being almost infinite… therefore the lawgiver behoved to 
give arbitrary power to the judge for determining in those emergencies, by the rules of 
equity and to heighten or diminish the punishment, as the circumstances of the fact 
require”.53 
 
Here the terms ‘extraordinary’ and ‘arbitrary’ are grouped together making it clear 
that one is synonymous with the other, and thus an injury subject to extraordinary 
punishment is merely one which has no set penalty and must be considered by the judge on 
a case by case basis.54 Bayne makes a similar statement confirming the purpose of arbitrary 
punishment, stating that the punishment for real injuries “is arbitrary, and is governed by 
the circumstances of the case, according as they do either plead mitigation or severity”.55 
Far from merely indicating when the conduct was worse these statements reveal that 
arbitrary (and therefore extraordinary) punishment was as equally concerned with 
mitigation as with aggravation.  
 
The above accounts are therefore at odds with the concept of there being any 
distinction between extraordinary and arbitrary punishment, as hinted by Forbes. Indeed, it 
is highly unlikely that Forbes intended to create such a distinction.56 What then, was 
Forbes’ purpose? It may well have been his attempt to incorporate the idea of 
                                                 
52 In the modern sense: judicial discretion being of the nature of arbitrary punishment, this of course meant 
that there was perhaps a great deal of aggravating factors in the sentencing stage for such crimes. 
53 Sir George Mackenzie, The Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal (2nd edn, 1699), Appendix 
on Mutilation and Demembration by Sir Alexander Seton of Pitmedden, at p.55, para. 161 and 162 (my 
emphasis added); see generally paras. 157-187. 
54 This is in line with Ulpian’s comments at D.48.19.13. 
55  Alexander Bayne, Institutions, Title on Injuries, para.18, p.191. 
56 This seems clear from Part I, Book I, Chapter VI, 2. 
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atrociousness, as referred to by Mackenzie. This theory maintains the idea that Forbes did 
intend to essentially highlight a category of aggravations, which would set him aside from 
his peers. This theory, however, struggles to explain why Forbes chose to use terminology 
which already played a prominent role in punishment and sentencing, of which he was 
likely well aware.  
 
If, however, one follows the logic of Seton and Bayne then the title on 
extraordinary injuries should be viewed as a list of examples to illustrate the ways in which 
an arbitrary judge could be influenced by the circumstances to deliver a harsher sentence. 
Under this theory the title provides an explanatory tool for arbitrary punishment and how 
circumstances might inform punishment. This would appear to be supported by Seton’s 
comments in Mutilation and Demembation, where he states that: 
 
“the nature of this arbitrary punishment is not commonly understood, and the 
very nature of it is ready to give offence to some who may apprehend that an arbitrary 
judge may do what he pleases… I shall therefore crave liberty to describe the power of 
an arbitrary judge; and the nature of arbitrary punishment; for the benefit of those who 
do not well understand it.”57 
 
More generally, perhaps the best way to understand the apparent confusion is to 
consider those discussions where extraordinary punishments are treated as synonymous 
with ‘aggravations’ as akin to modern sentencing guidelines: the concept that 
circumstances in cases of arbitrary punishment could serve to either increase or decrease 
the severity of the sentence shares more in common with our notions of such guidelines 
than it does with our understanding of aggravations. This would help explain Bayne’s 
apparent insistence on atrociousness for real injuries; the requirement represented the 
administrative practice at the time, rather than some guiding principle of the substantive 
law. Otherwise when Mackenzie tells us that all real injuries are subject to arbitrary 
punishment (and are therefore all extraordinary injuries),58 one would expect to find such 
atrocious crimes placed much further up in Mackenzie’s treatment, or at least at the 
beginning of the title on injuries. 
 
 
                                                 
57 Supra fn.51 at p.55, para. 160. 
58 Mackenzie, MC, Title 30, 4. 
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1.3 ‘Injuries’ as Assault in the Seventeenth Century 
 
 What, then, constituted an ‘injury’ in the seventeenth century and under what 
circumstances did one commit the offence? Mackenzie explains that the term ‘injury’ has 
both a general and specific meaning: the former more comprehensive sense “may give a 
name to all crimes, for all crimes are injuries”; and the latter, specific meaning is that 
injuries are akin to “contumely or reproach”, being divided into those committed “by 
thoughts, deeds, words, and gestures”.59 It is this second, more specific, sense of the word 
that we are concerned with. Forbes talks in similar terms of injuries in the specific sense 
being a “malicious exposing [of] one’s reputation or character in the world to contempt and 
shame”,60 while Bayne states that every unjust action which “trespasses upon the right of 
another man, done designedly, may well be called an injury”.61 The language suggests a 
focus on rights in personality, specifically humiliation and harassment, and none of the 
definitions explicitly reference physical wellbeing, save that Bayne’s description of ‘rights’ 
is broad enough to include a right to physical integrity. 
 
 Each author details the different types of conduct which could constitute the 
offence. Mackenzie tells us that injuries were divided into those committed “by thoughts, 
deeds, words, and gestures… but the more received division is that injuries [were] either 
verbal or real.”62 Here Mackenzie gives us an exhaustive list of the types of conduct which 
would constitute the offence, before outlining the broader categories under which these 
types of conduct fall. The primary categories of verbal (iniuria verbalis) and real (iniuria 
realis) find their roots as sub-categories in the delict of injury (iniuria) in Roman law.63 
This tradition appears to have been unanimously accepted by all of the writers at this time 
and for some centuries after, up until Scots law started to recognise a distinction between 
delicts and crimes.  
 
Mackenzie’s list shows a clear emphasis on attacks to reputation as only “deeds” 
suggests the possibility of physical altercations. Equally interesting is the inclusion of 
                                                 
59 Ibid, Title 30, 1. 
60 W Forbes, Institutes, Vol 2, Part I, Book IV, Chapter IX, 1 (all references hereafter refer to Volume 2, Part 
I, Book IV unless stated otherwise). 
61 Bayne, Institutions, Title on Injuries, p.175, para.2. 
62 Mackenzie, MC, Title 30, 1; Forbes, Institutes, Chapter IX, Title I, 1 (verbal), 4 (real) & 5 (written); 
Bayne, Institutions, p.175, para.2. 
63 Justinian, Institutes IV, 4, 1; D.47.10.1.1-2. For an overview, see OF Robinson, The Criminal Law of 
Ancient Rome (1995) at pp.49-51; P Birks “Harassment and hubris: the right to an equality of respect” (1997) 
32 Irish Jurist 1 at pp.5-14. 
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“thoughts” as a way of committing the offence. One would assume that “words” covered 
those both written and spoken, thus the reference to thoughts would appear to be an 
example of Roman legal foundations being augmented by religious overtones. Indeed, 
Mackenzie never expands on this concept so we never learn how thoughts were supposed 
to have been policed, leading one to assume that its inclusion was purely as a nod to 
spiritual, rather than actual, authorities. Mackenzie’s division gives us a flavour for how 
the Roman legal tradition was received into Scots law, but represents only his 
interpretation of the more respected division of real and verbal injuries. We shall therefore 
examine each of these in turn.  
 
1.4 Real Injuries 
 
 Real injuries were those which could be described as deeds or gestures designed to 
harm the victim by Mackenzie. It included the type of conduct which constitutes the 
modern law of assault, but was not restricted to breaches of physical integrity. Mackenzie 
tells us that real injuries are committed by: 
 
  “hindering a man to use what is his own, by removing his seat out of its place in 
the church, by giving a man medicaments which may affront him, by arresting his 
stooks {seizing his stacked sheaves} unjustly, by wearing in contempt what belongs to 
another man as a mark of honour, by razing shamefully a man’s hair or beard, by 
offering to strike him in public, or by striking him, or riving [ripping] or abusing his 
clothes, or his house, and many other ways”.64 
 
 Conduct which would be today described as either criminal damage to property or 
as a civil wrong appears to dominate Mackenzie’s understanding of real injuries. Blackie 
tells us that Scottish lairds often had grand lofts in the church which would be put at risk 
under social and religious tensions. The tearing down of these lofts was of course the 
breach of a property right but also a very public disparagement of status and dignity, 
viewed as equal in severity to the bodily injuries and harsh language that also occurred.65 
Indeed we only find the first instance involving physical contact with another person as the 
fifth item on Mackenzie’s list, and then it is merely the ‘razing’ of a man’s (facial) hair.66 
                                                 
64 Mackenzie, MC, Title 30, 3 (my emphasis added). 
65 Blackie, “Unity in Diversity”, at p.79. 
66 Which presumably means to cut outwith the context of a salon/barbershop. One example in this regard 
raises an interesting question: could a barber who had initially been given permission to cut a man’s hair be 
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Further, the next item is about threatening to do physical harm, before finally Mackenzie 
states that actually striking would also constitute a real injury. It is noteworthy that threats 
are treated here as comparable to the infliction of violence.  
 
It is also interesting to note that threats were considered real, and not verbal, 
injuries. This is of importance because real injuries were always regarded as a state matter 
warranting treatment in the criminal courts, whereas verbal injuries were not.67 Thus, even 
in the seventeenth century and despite, at that time, a lack of clear distinction between 
delicts and crimes, there still appears to have been some divergence between conduct 
which threatened bodily integrity versus that which merely caused offence. Forbes offers a 
similar account, giving the following examples of real injury: 
 
 “As by painting him in fools colours, or with asses ears; by fixing a gallows, 
pillory, horns, or any other shameful sign at his door; by using some indignity to his 
person, as the giving him medicaments to affront him, spitting in his face, striking him 
with a cane, or lifting up a cane to strike him; by hindering him to use what is his own, 
as the removing his seat in the church, wearing his coat of arms”.68 
 
 Forbes’ account is far more structured than that of Mackenzie, and he offers us 
three main categories by which a real injury might be committed: by depicting the victim 
in an insulting fashion; by attacking him; or by hindering him to make use of property 
which was in some way linked to his standing in society (i.e. the Church and aristocracy).69 
Once again, the wrongfulness of a physical assault is presented amongst other, more trivial, 
acts classified as real injuries. 
 
 The above categorisations and examples given seem to be heavily influenced by a 
broader notion of honour and reputation, rather than respect to individual autonomy per se. 
There appears to be a shift in attitude, at least between authors if not time periods, as to 
what it meant to be insulted as removing the victim’s seat in church, previously the first 
                                                 
guilty of real injury if his customer decided that the cut was too short? Does ‘shamefully’ refer to a dole 
requirement, or did negligence suffice? 
67 Mackenzie, MC, Title 30, 4. Cf. Hamilton v Blair (1724): Hector, Renfrewshire Sheriff Court 105 at p.106 
where it was open to argument that a mixture of threats with throwing stones should be classified as a verbal 
injury. 
68 Forbes, Institutes, Chapter IX, Title 1, 4 (my emphasis added). 
69 Bayne tells us that “Injuries were likewise understood to be done to the Living through the persons of the 
Dead, whose Representatives they were, as by disturbing their Ashes… which is thought would hold in our 
law”, Institutions, p.188. 
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example given by Mackenzie, is now much further down the list. It is unclear how strong 
an inference can be drawn here, but it is noticeable that both authors use many of the same 
examples, and Forbes was heavily influenced by Matters Criminal, yet they feature at 
different points. 
 
 Within the category of attacks, again threats are treated as comparable with physical 
assault. Both Mackenzie and Forbes’ treatment of threats are thus woefully inadequate as 
they set no real parameters for how such threats might be treated as real injuries. For 
example, from the limited case law it seems that brandishing a gun at the victim would 
constitute an injury even where the weapon was not capable of being fired, 70 but there is 
no indication of whether the victim had to know this. However, similar threats appear to 
have been charged as real injuries71  or breaches of the peace, 72 and thus examining 
Forbes’ treatment of breach of the peace is illustrative in this respect, as he notes there that 
if the threat in question is one where “a man [shows] himself unusually armed, or 
[brandishes] a weapon, and thereby strikes a fear into those unarmed” he will be guilty of 
raising an affray.73 A valid threat of violence therefore required causing apprehension in the 
victim. Thus, real injuries appear to have encompassed not just physical integrity but also 
fear and alarm caused in the victim. 
 
 Bayne offers a contrasting explanatory model for real injuries, and one which 
appears to give physical injury the level of gravitas that the modern law would expect. He 
begins by stating that real injuries were committed by “certain actions which inflict 
personal hurt, or which offer an indignity or insult”,74 which is not dissimilar to his peers. 
However, as aforementioned above,75 he introduces a de minimus exception, stating that 
the law would only take notice of those indignities which were “atrocious”; anything less 
would not attract liability. An injury could become atrocious in the following ways: by the 
nature of injury, “as if a blow or wound is given”; by the character of the person offended, 
such as against a magistrate, parent or master; and by the circumstances of time or place, 
for example when it is committed in a public place or during a time of divine service.76 
 
                                                 
70 Brown v Alexander (1757) Hume, i, 443.  
71 Cochran (1717) Renfrewshire Sheriff Court 215. 
72 Captain Andrew Nairne (1712) Hume, i, 442.  
73 Forbes, Institutes, Book III, Chapter VIII, Title II, §2. 
74 Bayne, Institutions, p.180, para.8. 
75 See p17. 
76 Ibid. 
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 The implication is therefore that all real injuries were atrocious, and thus the guilt 
was very great.77 Bayne’s account is also unique in its reference to physical injuries as a 
general category, standing in contrast to the arbitrary examples given by other accounts. It 
therefore provides the most emphatic support for physical attacks and their resulting 
injuries as being important in the seventeenth century. Both Mackenzie and Forbes seem to 
shy away from physical altercations in their treatment of real injuries and neither author 
says much other than that such injuries were to be punished arbitrarily. Only Bayne 
appears to think it worth recognising the severity of striking and/or wounding within his 
work, but even he only spends one paragraph on the topic.  
 
 It is clear from each account examined that physical altercations appear to have 
enjoyed no real significance within the real injuries category. Indeed, actions which 
attacked another’s religion or reputation appear to have been of equal or greater 
importance. This can in part be explained due to more serious injuries being treated as 
separate offences entirely. It is worth considering them in greater detail.   
 
1.4.1 Serious Injuries as ‘Mayhem’ 
 
The sources indicate that serious forms of physical injury were treated under a 
separate offence in the seventeenth century. Despite this, the literature is perhaps the most 
inconsistent in this area. Forbes’ Institutes, for example, includes a chapter on the 
‘mutilation’78 (rendering useless) and ‘dismembration’79 (removal) of body parts, known 
collectively as ‘mayhem’,80 which comes before his treatment of injuries (presumably 
because it was more atrocious).81 Bayne however, probably influenced by Mackenzie 
(discussed below), does not recognise mayhem at all. Instead, in his treatment of real 
injuries, he states that of the three “foundations of atrocity”, the nature of the injury is the 
most important: 
 
                                                 
77 Mackenzie, MC, Title 2, 5. 
78 Forbes (1626) 1 JC 44; Hamilton (1628) 1 JC 82, 90. Prosecution for mutilation could not be brought 
before the expiry of one year and a day from the incident, in order to determine whether or not the injury 
would properly heal: Forbes, Institutes, Chapter VIII, 5; Seton on Mutilation, Part I, paras. 69 & 71-72; 
Haliburton (1640) 2 JC 389. 
79 Known more commonly as ‘demembration’; John Rogers (1641) 2 JC 505; Young (1642) 2 JC 529. 
80 Mutilation and dismembration/demembration shall be referred to hereafter collectively as ‘mayhem’. 
81 Forbes, Institutes, Chapter VIII. 
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 “and with respect to wounds given, the atrocity of the injury is heightened, either 
by the greatness of the wound, or the place of the body where it is inflicted”.82 
 
 Thus, for Bayne injuries could be aggravated by the level of harm caused. This is 
striking because his contemporaries treat serious injury as a separate crime, rather than as 
an aggravated form of the basic injury.  
 
 Rather curiously, Mackenzie does not appear to recognise serious injuries at all in 
his original treatment. Indeed, the short paragraph on real injuries in Title 30 contains the 
only reference to physical violence, and half of the examples do not involve any kind of 
injury to bodily integrity. However, this list is not intended to be exhaustive and Mackenzie 
refers the reader to the work of the Saxon jurist, Matthius Berlichius, as providing other 
examples.83 Mackenzie appears to have taken much of his inspiration for real injuries from 
Berlichius’ work; many examples are direct transplants such as removing one’s seat 
(bench) from church84 and unjustly arresting stooks.85 Berlichius’ list is far more extensive, 
though it lacks any kind of structure, including a mixture of real, verbal and written 
injuries. Specifically, it does include further examples of physical injuries which were 
absent from Mackenzie’s work, so that striking someone with a hand, elbow or razor,86 
wounding,87 or overpowering someone88 would all count as injuries, and Mackenzie 
presumably accepted these within his own scheme of injuries. It does not, however, seem 
to deal with the topic of mayhem as we see discussed in Forbes or alluded to in Bayne. 
 
 Hume suggests in his Commentaries that Mackenzie omitted to take special notice 
of such injuries as distinct from other real injuries because they were not capital crimes,89 
but it certainly seems odd given that both his contemporaries recognised their distinction in 
works which were derivative of Matters Criminal. In any case, an appendix on mayhem 
was included with the second edition, written by Sir Alexander Seton of Pitmedden.90 
Seton writes at great lengths explaining exactly what constituted a ‘member’ – this was of 
great importance because if the body part injured was not considered a ‘member’ then a 
                                                 
82 Ibid. 
83 Mackenzie, MC, Title 30, 3 citing M Berlichius, Pars Conclusionum Practicabilium (Leipzig, Jena, 1651), 
Part 5, conc. 59 ss84-125. 
84 Berlichius, ibid, s106. 
85 Ibid. s120. 
86 Ibid. ss. 87-90. 
87 Ibid. s.91. 
88 Ibid. s.95. 
89 Hume, i, 330.  
90 Supra fn.53. 
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charge of mayhem could not be brought.91 Seton’s treatment has been criticised by Blackie 
as giving “a false impression of the significance of the term ‘demembration’”, arguing that 
Seton misunderstood that the purpose of mutilation/demembration and other sub-categories 
of injury (such as invasion and effusion of blood) was merely to determine the sentence. 
This would conform with Bayne’s account. Thus, the distinction between demembration 
and mutilation was only relevant with respect to the rule that in cases of mutilation 
proceedings could only be brought after a year and a day, a time frame used to provide 
certainty that the body part was permanently damaged, which was unnecessary where the 
body part was removed completely.92 However, Blackie himself notes that by 1640 cases 
were being published with each term being averred separately, suggesting that it was not 
only Seton who recognised a distinction between the types of injury.93 Thus, it is apparent 
that in the seventeenth century, serious physical injuries were treated separately from real 
injuries.  
 
1.5 Verbal Injuries 
 
Mackenzie explains that verbal injuries could be of two types: those that are 
patently “unwarrantable expressions” such as to call a man a cheat or a woman a whore; 
and those expressions which vary according to the intention of the speaker, described by 
Forbes as those “obliquely” spoken, and must therefore be proved as injurious in the 
context which they were received (such as ironically: “You are an honest man”94), with the 
speaker being allowed to “purge his guilt by declaring his intention”.95 It was therefore an 
essential characteristic of verbal injuries that the offender intended to commit the crime, 
known as the animus injuriandi. 96 The insult had to have a “manifest and visible tendency 
to defamation, and to lessen one’s character and reputation in the world”, and thus words 
may be insulting but nevertheless ignored by the law if they had no “tendency to 
defamation”.97 Thus, more obscure comments or those that only held meaning to the 
                                                 
91 Ibid. Part I, at para.13. Seton’s account has been described as “tedious hair-splitting detail” by DM Walker 
in Scottish Jurists (1985) at p.181. See also Cheynes v Mowat and Ors (1641) 2 JC 463 which libeled only 
mutilation but would be considered a case of demembration by Seton as the destruction of a thumb or fingers 
amounted to this. 
92 J Blackie, “Unity in Diversity”, at p.48. 
93 Roger (1641) 2 JC 505; Young (1642) 2 JC 529; and indeed see Erskine, Institute Part II at 4, 4, 50 who 
recognises a distinction.  
94 Forbes, Institutes, Part I, Book IV, Chapter IX, Title I, 1. 
95 Mackenzie, MC, Title 30, 2; Forbes, Institutes,  Chapter IX, Title 1, 1. 
96 Bayne, Institutions, Title on Injuries, p.176, paras. 3-4.  
97 Ibid, para.3. 
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parties involved might not have been recognised as valid injuries, suggesting an emphasis 
on public shame rather than personal offence to the victim. 
 
 Mackenzie tells us that verbal injuries between private individuals were punished 
only by the Commissars, who were Christian judges with the “least criminal jurisdiction of 
all other courts”.98 Thus the Privy Council would remit cases of verbal injuries to the 
Commissars except where the victim of such an injury was a “person of quality”, such as a 
magistrate, and then the case could also be heard by the criminal courts. As aforementioned 
this exclusive jurisdiction came from the view that verbal injuries were scandals, and thus 
on top of the standard pecuniary penalty the court would also hand down church censures, 
such as being forced to stand at the church-doors to expiate a slander.99 
 
 To make matters confusing, however, Mackenzie states that if the verbal injury was 
not deemed a scandal, but rather reflected upon the honour of the party injured (such as to 
call a man a “puppy or an ass”), it could become a matter for the Privy Council.100 This 
would appear to create an intermediate level where some verbal injuries were dealt with 
more severely than others, but not enough to warrant the attention of the criminal courts. 
Indeed, from the examples given one could argue that any direct, or ‘patently 
unwarrantable’, expression that did not attack the piety of the victim should not be 
considered a scandal, depending on how one defines the word, and would therefore 
warrant the involvement of the Council.101 However, this argument, and indeed the 
statement by Mackenzie in general, appears to be at odds with the general consensus about 
terminology at that time: Blackie states that ‘slander’, ‘defame’ and ‘scandal’ were all 
synonyms.102 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 Mackenzie, MC, Part II, Title 10, 2. The Commissary courts succeeded the pre-Reformation episcopal 
courts and had jurisdiction over matters concerning familial relations, such as adultery, aliment, bigamy, 
divorce etc. Very few cases were recorded, but some are available from FP Walton (ed), Lord Hermand’s 
Consistorial Decisions 1684-1777 (1940)(Stair Society, Vol. 6). 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Indeed one of the two most common definitions for the word ‘scandal’ is in religious use, used to describe 
something that hinders reception of the faith or obedience to the Divine law – it is at least questionable how 
liberally the word ‘scandal’ was interpreted by the law in the seventeenth century, and equally how eager the 
criminal courts were to take jurisdiction for such crimes: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/171874?rskey=OCbx5w&result=1#eid at 1.b. 
102 J Blackie, “Defamation”, at p.642.  
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1.5.1 Written Injuries 
 
 A quick note should also be made of written injuries in seventeenth century 
Scotland. Mackenzie tells us that “infamous libels” are the “most permanent of all injuries, 
and therefore are most severely punished” as the offender “shows more design, and 
therefore is more guilty”.103 Thus, one who wrote, dictated or affixed infamous libels or 
caused them to be so written, dictated or affixed in public was punishable. He tells us that 
punishment was arbitrary save for abuse of the Prince or where a capital crime was alleged 
against any man.104 This appears to be the only instance of Mackenzie giving an example 
of how arbitrary punishment was to be utilised, stating that punishment could be lessened 
where the accused was a minor, was provoked, took it down before it was fully written or 
after it was affixed, confessed his fault and said that he did it only out of passion, or if what 
was said was true.105 
 
 Bayne’s account supports this view of written injuries, emphasising the severity of 
publishing “defamatory libels or pasquils” as being the most permanent.106 However, he 
distinguished between written injuries and ‘pasquils’; the latter imputed some crime or 
great offence which was more than contumely or reproach, it was published anonymously, 
and it was “industriously made public”.107 He repeats the idea of arbitrary punishment for 
the majority of written injuries but states that capital punishment was given for pasquils108 
published against the King or where a capital crime was alleged against an innocent man 
(which, based on his definition presumably also qualifed as a pasquil), although Bayne 
appears to disagree with this latter case, stating that the punishment was “too severe” and 
seemed to be “without foundation, at least, is not very consistent with the spirit of the said 
law”.109 
 
 Forbes differs from the other accounts in that he makes no distinction between the 
severity of written injuries in comparison with verbal or real injuries, and the term 
‘infamous libels’ is not to be found in Title I of chapter IX.110 Further, there is no mention 
                                                 
103 Mackenzie, MC, Title 30, 5. 
104 Ibid. But sometimes the speaker was ‘only’ scourged and banished. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Bayne, Institutions at p.178, para.6. 
107 Ibid at p.179 
108 Not written injuries generally – Bayne perhaps confuses his choice of words since he cites Mackenzie as 
his source here: Bayne, op cit at p.179. 
109 Ibid at p.179-180. 
110 He uses the terms ‘pasquil’ and ‘defamatory libel’ as synonyms for ‘written injury’: Forbes, Institutes, 
Chapter IX, Title 1, 5. 
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of capital punishment as he tells us that both written and real injuries were subject to 
arbitrary punishment (with no exceptions) within the same sentence.111 Forbes also placed 
emphasis on the injurious writing being published, something that was mentioned by 
Bayne but is absent from Mackenzie. He tells us that a written injury was a print, writing 
or inscription which was “composed and published” and that the “ordering a printer to 
print a scandalous pamphlet [was] sufficient publication thereof”.112 
 
  The concept of a written injury is interesting for our purposes because it typifies 
how the concept of offences against the person was understood then as opposed to now. It 
is curious that for the likes of Mackenzie a written injury was considered the worst type of 
injury imaginable, although this perhaps makes more sense if one accepts that serious 
injuries (mayhem) were not considered ‘injuries’ during this time. Indeed, the idea of 
offences against the person being inextricably linked to the concepts of honour and 
reputation is arguably no better personified than by the idea of criminal liability for 
defamation, and thus when the influence of the English law of libel and slander results in 
such injuries being treated as delicts rather than crimes, we inevitably witness a shift in the 
underlying principles which guide this area of law. 
 
1.6 Honour and Harm in the Seventeenth Century  
 
 None of the seventeenth century authors spend much time discussing real injuries, 
giving the impression that causing the victim embarrassment, especially amongst his peers, 
seems to have been of primary importance – perhaps more so than being struck outright. It 
is quite amazing, however, just how minimised the concept of minor physical injury was in 
seventeenth century accounts. Mackenzie wrote over five hundred words discussing verbal 
injuries; he wrote only eighty-nine on real injuries. Perhaps a longer discussion was 
necessary to justify the criminalisation of insults, precisely because they were treated as 
less serious, but there is virtually no discussion at all concerning physical injury – merely 
solitary, arbitrary examples.  Indeed it is certainly curious that only Bayne should deem it 
necessary to make the point that “[t]he law extends its care and protection to our reputation 
and good name, as well as to our persons and estates, by the sanctions of those laws which 
chastise the contumelious and malicious reproaches”.113 Forbes’ chapter heading for 
                                                 
111 Ibid at Title I, 7. 
112 See also HMA v Lord Balmerino (1634) 3 Cobbett’s State Trials 591 where the court rejected the view that 
being posted in public was an essential element of an infamous libel/written injury.  
113 Bayne, Institutions, p.174, para.1 (my emphasis added). 
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injuries, “Of Crimes and Offences committed against one’s Fame or Honour, called 
Injuries”,114 is absent of any kind of reference to physical attacks, and Mackenzie states 
that the term ‘injuries’ is to be regarded as synonymous with contumely or reproach, words 
which refer to the acts of insulting or expressing one’s disapproval.115 The result is that the 
discourse at this time on the law of injuries is specifically concerned with actions which 
offend reputation.  
 
 One must therefore view the types of conduct which came under the ‘injuries’ 
heading not as offences of violence, but rather as infringements on rights in personality in 
the victim. Even so, it is still unclear why every author discusses verbal injuries in great 
detail and before discussions of real injuries. We know that Mackenzie structured the 
crimes in Matters Criminal on a descending level of atrociousness,116 and both Forbes117 
and Bayne118 follow this pattern, suggesting that, as a rule of thumb, those that come 
before are the more severe. The implication is therefore that verbal injuries were at least as, 
if not more atrocious than real injuries (at least those which could not be classified as 
mayhem). 
 
 This apparent anomaly might be explained by the influence of the Church during 
this period: many of the courts were ecclesiastical in nature119 and Catholicism had been 
criminalised, punishable by death.120 Despite the hierarchical nature of Scottish society in 
the seventeenth century, there was a shared religious culture which espoused the idea of 
restraint as promoting a godly life.121 Where real injuries were dealt with by the criminal 
courts, verbal injuries between private parties were exclusively dealt with by Christian 
Judges, scandal being a church censure.122 Blackie argues that this jurisdiction had a 
crucial effect on the development of the substantive law of both real and verbal injuries; for 
                                                 
114 Forbes, Institutes,  Part I, Book IV, Chapter IX. 
115 Mackenzie, MC, Title 30, 1. On “contumely” see P Birks op cit, at p.8. 
116 OF Robinson, supra fn.46 at p.14. 
117 Forbes, Institutes, Part I, Book I, Chapter VI, 3. 
118 Bayne, Institutions, Preliminary Observations, p.7, para. 6. 
119 The General Assembly was the governing body of the Church of Scotland in addition to being the 
supreme court at that time: supra fn.11 at p. xvii. 
120 Mackenzie, MC, Title 3, 5: “By our Act 21… blasphemy… or any of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity, 
shall be likewise punishable by death, if they obstinately continue therein”; see also Title 4, 3 on Heresy, 
where reference to Catholics as ‘heretics’ is made. 
121 Blackie, “Unity in Diversity”, at p.35.  
122 Mackenzie, MC, Title 30, 4. Note that the criminal courts could punish verbal injuries against magistrates. 
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example the marrying of the defamation123 and scandal concepts made it natural to see 
such claims as penal.124  
 
Further, where compensation was sought ad damna et interesse it was understood 
that this aspect was not penal but rather civil in nature, however the records rarely made 
reference to this distinction, as the concept was seen as trite.125 Thus, actions for 
patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss were often conflated, and real injuries in particular 
straddled both types of loss (verbal injuries causing patrimonial loss being an undeveloped 
concept). This in turn resulted in a minimisation of the distinction between verbal and real 
injuries with the focus being on the general concept of iniuria, or ‘honour and reputation’. 
Iniuria as understood by the Romans is described by Birks as being so tied to the concept 
of ‘contemptuous harassment’ that it necessarily dictated the types of conduct which were 
considered injurious, i.e. those acts calculated to cause distress in the nature of anger and 
humiliation to the victim.126 Thus it was the iniuria that was important – not how the 
iniuria was committed. In other words – where the aim of the law was to punish actions 
calculated to cause anger and humiliation, it should make little difference as to whether 
this is done through actions or words.  
 
Blackie’s work can also help explain the lopsided treatment of these injuries by 
seventeenth century writers; he suggests that the reason why, in contrast to ‘real injury’, 
‘verbal injury’ is frequently found expressed is due to a lack of sub-categorisation.127 Thus, 
there was no need to refer to ‘real injuries’ when terms such as mutilation, effusion of 
blood and wounding existed (categories which often had their own treatment within jurists’ 
work); the concept was trite.128 This explanation, if accepted, would mean that the structure 
of physical injury did not lend itself to conceptualising more basic physical injuries where 
an appropriate sub-category did not exist.129 Indeed in one case it was argued that where a 
charge did not contain slaughter, mutilation, demembration, or the drawing of blood, it 
should not be pursued criminally at all; this argument was rejected but clearly 
                                                 
123 Understood here in its modern sense.  
124 Blackie, “Unity in Diversity” at p.36. 
125 Ibid, p.36-37.  
126 Birks, op cit at p.11; see also OF Robinson, Criminal Law of Ancient Rome at p.49: “the essence of the 
offence was the outrage suffered.”  
127 Ibid, p.77. 
128 Ibid and see D Daube, “The Self-Understood in Legal History” 1973 JR 126. 
129 And indeed there are not many cases. For a rare example see Colqhoun (1694) 2 Justiciary Records of 
Argyll and the Isles 60 (case 95) in J Cameron (ed), The Justiciary Records of Argyll and the Isles 1664-1705, 
Vol I (1949, Stair Society). It also does not help that many crimes of violence were frequently settled by out 
of court agreements, just as civil disputes are settled today: see M Wasser, “Defence counsel in early modern 
Scotland: A study based on the High Court of Justiciary” (2005) 26 Journal of Legal History 183 at p.194. 
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demonstrates the apathetic mood shared by some towards less serious (i.e. non-life-
threatening) injuries.130 
  
1.7 Injuries as Intentional Acts 
 
 The seventeenth century sources provide very little analysis of the culpability 
element required for criminal liability. The totality of Mackenzie’s discussion on 
culpability for injuries is within the context of verbal injuries, where he states that “injuries 
are estimated according to the design of the offender”.131 He adds that fools, mad men, 
children and other such ‘distracted persons’ were not punishable for injuries, because “such 
persons are understood to have no evil design; and injuries are reckoned according to the 
offender’s design”.132 It is unclear why real injuries appear to be precluded from this 
discussion. It may have been an oversight as Forbes makes no mention of this distinction 
when he makes the point, although Bayne does not mention the defence at all despite 
discussing several other concepts which Forbes mentions, namely that verbal injuries may 
be retorted lawfully, and that one could be injured vicariously through their wife, children 
or servants.133 Further, it is unclear how extensive this ‘distracted persons’ defence actually 
was as both Mackenzie and Forbes tell us, for example, that children may yet still be guilty 
of beating or cursing their parents,134 and Mackenzie tells us further that drunken offenders 
will not be excused if it is clear that they became drunk with a view to offending.135 
 
The fact that the design had to be ‘evil’ suggests that something more than 
negligence was required to attract liability, but it is unclear whether recklessness would 
suffice. Generally speaking, Mackenzie talks of the “wickedness of the design” making an 
action criminal, and that it was the design of law-givers “only to punish such acts as were 
designedly malicious”, but also noted that “because design is a private and concealed act of 
the mind... in some cases this dolus is allowed by law to be inferred from conjectures and 
                                                 
130 Howison (1643) 3 JC 578. Panel argued against mutilation or demebration despite the fact that the victim 
was assaulted by ‘a wedock’ (garden hoe) which left them blinded in one eye. The resulting charge of 
mutilation was sustained. Cf. Young (1642) 2 JC 529 where blinding was considered demembration. Note 
that panel in Howison argued without legal representation, however a similar argument appears to have been 
pled by counsel of the day: James Scrymgeuer (1619) Pitcairn III, 467; Patrick Martin and Ors, (1647) 3 JC 
759. 
131 Mackenzie, MC, Title 30, 2. 
132 Ibid; Forbes, Institutes, Part I, Book IV, Chapter IX, 2. 
133 Forbes, Institutes, Part I, Book IV, Chapter IX, 2 at (b), (h) and (i); contrast with Bayne, op cit at Title on 
Injuries, p.186-188, paras. 14-15. 
134 Forbes, Institutes, Part I, Book IV, Chapter IX, Title II, §2.4; Mackenzie, MC, Title 14, 6. 
135 Mackenzie, MC, Title 30, 2: “except the offender did become drunk upon design to offend, ‘si non ex 
proposito sed ex impetu deliquit’.” 
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presumptions, where the act is such as of its own nature may be good or evil”.136 Likewise, 
Forbes speaks of persons being “engaged or moved to commit a crime” either out of 
premeditation, impulse or imprudence.137 Bayne states that “malevolent intention, is an 
essential ingredient” to crime, but that such intention might be inferred from negligence 
which was “extremely supine”.138 The scope then for reckless injury appears to have been 
there, but the descriptive nature of the conduct rules, particularly for real injuries, seems to 
preclude such injuries in a majority of cases.  
 
1.8 Aggravations  
 
 Aggravations of assault are an important concept for our purposes given that 
historically this is how Scots law has chosen to distinguish different degrees of harm in 
assault. As aforementioned, historically there was no clear-cut structure of aggravations 
that one could turn to begin determining any kind of grading function in the law. Instead, 
what we would call aggravating circumstances were peppered throughout the law under the 
guise of separate offences, or as parasitic to other crimes, and these examples shall be 
noted here. 
 
 Aggravations of assault which rely on an intent to commit a further crime, i.e. to 
rob or to ravish, did not exist in the same way we now understand them, although the 
wrongful conduct was criminalised in other ways. Robbery, for example, was considered to 
be a theft aggravated by violence, rather than violence aggravated by theft.139 Likewise, 
rape or ravishing seems to have been more closely aligned with kidnapping than general 
violence per se, so that all instances of violence that occur were only considered part of the 
factual narrative and therefore a charge of ravishing could be maintained even where a 
woman was merely carried away and not subsequently sexually assaulted (although 
punishment was far less severe).140 Only Bayne seems to recognise an affinity shared by 
assault and sexual assault stating that “[a]ll violence of what kind soever is criminal; but it 
becomes more so, when the persons upon whom it is committed are particularly taken into 
the protection of the law”.141 The rule of thumb therefore appears to have been that if an 
                                                 
136 MC, Title 1, 4.  
137 Forbes, Institutes, Part I, Book I, Chapter I, 2.  
138 Bayne, Institutions, p.9, para.9. 
139 Mackenzie, MC, Title 34, 1; Forbes, Institutes, Chapter VII, §1: “It is a rape… where first attacked by the 
ravisher”; Bayne, Institutions, p.135, para.1: “Robbery is in effect a violent theft.” 
140 Mackenzie, MC, Title 16, 4; Forbes, Institutes, Chapter X, Title VII: “Robbery is, the taking away another 
man’s goods or money… by force and violence.” 
141 Bayne, Institutions, Title on Rape at p.59. 
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assault involved the commission of a second, more serious offence, the conduct would be 
recognised as an example of that more serious crime. 
 
 However, it was not just assaults with further intent that were treated as examples 
of other crimes. Cursing one’s parents, an injury which would later be categorised as an 
aggravated type of injury by Hume,142 was positioned at the beginning of Mackenzie’s 
work as a form of blasphemy, retaining the function (if not the appearance) of an 
aggravated form of injury by virtue of being a capital crime.143 Equally, the harrassment or 
assault of officers of the state, such as any of the Session or Secret Council, far from being 
considered an assault aggravated by the character of the victim, was treated as an example 
of treason.144 Mackenzie appears to contradict himself as he tells us that the crime is 
“punishable by death, but not as treason” for only killing such a person will amount to the 
crime of treason.145 
 
 Mackenzie’s title on injuries is silent on physically assaulting magistrates (or any 
other type of special person for that matter), the conclusion being that assaulting (or 
harassing) an officer of the state could be classified neither as an injury nor treason, thus 
existing in some kind of limbo as a quasi-treasonous act.146 In one case the assault of a 
servant of a judge was regarded as ‘treasonable wounding’, the servant being considered an 
extension of the judge’s person, and thus presumably assaults against magistrates 
themselves would be considered as such too.147  
 
 Additionally, several instances of violence with peculiar circumstances, which in 
modern criminal law might readily be described as aggravated forms of assault, were 
treated as separate crimes altogether. It was noted earlier that serious injuries, i.e. those that 
maimed or amputated a body part of the victim, were generally treated as a separate 
offence and given their own, separate treatment. Likewise, deforcement made it a crime 
separate from injuries to attack any sheriff officer executing sentence whilst in their official 
                                                 
142 Hume, Commentaries, Book I, Chapter IX, 324. 
143 Mackenzie, MC, Title 3, 6; cf. Forbes (below). 
144 Mackenzie, MC, Title 6, 16; to be distinguished from deforcement which applied to assaults on sheriff 
officers/officers of arms in the course of carrying out their duties, see Title 26, 2. 
145 Mackenzie, MC, Title 6, 16. 
146 Many cases would be charged based on a description of the conduct, as opposed to some preordained 
offence, such as in Grahame (1603) II Pitcairn, 416 where the accused was charged with the “invasion of a 
minister, near the Tolbooth, where the Privy Council were sitting in judgement.” 
147 James Reid(Gray) (1640) 2 JC 387. 
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capacity.148 Some aggravations appear to have been treated more severely than others: in 
one instance the crime of deforcement appears to have been relegated to part of the factual 
narrative in a case concerning demembration and hamesucken.149 Walker suggests that 
‘riot’ was a term applied to violent and aggravated assault which did not require a group of 
people for its commission,150 there being an instance where it was charged against two 
women who seriously injured (and consequently killed) a man.151 However, both Forbes 
and Bayne suggest that a minimum number of persons was required for a riot,152 and 
rioting, mobbing and serious breach of the peace were conduct dealt with by the Privy 
Council, being concerned with public order, so it seems that a charge of rioting (as opposed 
to mayhem) was likely the exception rather than the rule. 
 
 Hamesucken, or attacking someone in their own home, was an extremely common 
type of injury, 153 and although different variations make up modern aggravations, the 
nomen juris is still indictable today. 154 This offence was given its own title in Matters 
Criminal155 and is said by Mackenzie to have been dealt with more severely because a man 
“expects more security and is least guarded against violence whilst he lives peacefully at 
home.”156 Bayne equally states that hamesucken was a type of real injury “punished with 
the greatest severity”.157 Peculiarly, both Bayne and Mackenzie refer to hamesucken as an 
“assault” in their treatment of the topic, but do not use the term elsewhere when discussing 
other types of injury, real or otherwise.158 Blackie notes that the rare usage of the term 
assault was confined to the military sense of sieging a building until the seventeenth 
                                                 
148 Ibid, Title 26, 2; Forbes, Institutes, Book V, Chapter III, Title II; Bayne, Institutions, Title on Deforcement 
at p.35ff.; Leith of Newleslie (1648) 3 JC 795. 
149 Hendersone (1609) III Pitcairn, 58; cf. Robert Angus (1640) 2 JC 396 where the charge was for 
‘deforcement and mutilation’. Hamesucken is discussed in more detail below. 
150 DM Walker, A Legal History of Scotland Vol IV (1996), at p.500. 
151 Symsone and Cleuch (1640) 2 JC 392, although ‘riot’ is described by JI Smith as meaning an “aggravated 
and prolonged assault” (my emphasis added) in Selected Justiciary Cases 1624-1650 Vol. II (1972, Stair 
Society); see also Johnnestoune (1605) II Pitcairn, 461 at 462 where demembration was described as a 
“manifest ryote”. 
152 Forbes states three minimum for a ‘petty riot’ and twelve for a ‘great riot’, Institutes, Part I, Book III, 
Chapter XIII, Title II, §2, 2; Bayne, Institutions, Title on Sedition, p.34 at para.3; Mackenzie is silent on the 
issue. See also Campbell (1678) 1 Justiciary Records of Argyll and the Isles 134 (case 60) in J Cameron (ed), 
The Justiciary Records of Argyll and the Isles 1664-1705, Vol I (1949, Stair Society) where the term ‘ryot’ is 
used to describe an assault by four men – the term is not used again in any other case of assault. 
153 Mackenzie, Title 21; There are many instances in the limited case reports: Chene (1602) II Pitcairn, 399; 
Maxwell (1605) II Pitcairn, 464; Hendersone (1609) III Pitcairn, 58; Crombie (1638) 1 JC 290; Stewart of 
Ryland (1643) 3 JC 588; Scott (1649) 3 JC 810 (an invasion of the Royal Palace, showing that ‘home’ was 
interpreted widely). 
154 Walker v HM Advocate 2014 JC 154.  
155 Although was capable of being pled as an aggravation to another crime: Title 21, 2. 
156 Mackenzie, MC, Title 21. 
157 Bayne, Institutions, at p.182, para.9; it was subject to capital punishment, ibid at para.13. 
158 Ibid. See in particular paras.9-12; Mackenzie, Title 21. 
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century, and suggests that the usage (by Mackenzie at least) was an extension of this 
definition – it certainly was not being used in the sense of identifying a nominate crime of 
assault.159 
 
 Forbes’ treatment of hamesucken formed part of what is perhaps the most 
structured approach to aggravations from this time period, offering the closest example to 
modern aggravations. As aforementioned Forbes posited a seemingly separate category 
known as ‘extraordinary injuries’; those injuries made so with respect to the place they 
were committed or in regard of the persons offended.160 A large part of Forbes’ treatment of 
the former category discusses hamesucken in similar terms to his contemporaries,161 
although he does provide other examples where an extraordinary injury of this kind would 
occur, such as starting a fight or disagreement in the church or church-yard the time of 
divine service; violating the tombs or sepulchres of the dead; or striking or hurting any 
person in the Justice Court or Outer House of Session while judges were sitting in 
judgment.162 
 
 Whereas Mackenzie offered scattered points which recognised an injury could be 
aggravated in regard to certain persons being offended (such as situations involving the 
monarchy or specific officers of the state),163 Forbes extends this to a succinct category of 
people of whom injuring, either physically or verbally, would be treated more severely.164 
Thus an injury done to the King,165 his privy counsellors, judges, magistrates and officers, 
parents, ministers, peers or “great men” constituted an extraordinary one.166 Of note, and in 
contrast to Mackenzie, Forbes included the capital crime of cursing or beating of parents 
by their children above the age of sixteen as an example of an extraordinary injury.167 One 
can draw the distinction that Mackenzie only spoke of cursing, and did not include beating 
within his definition of this form of ‘blasphemy’. 
 
                                                 
159 Blackie, “Unity in Diversity” at p.53. 
160 Forbes, Institutes, Part I, Book IV, Chapter IX, Title II. 
161 Ibid, Title II §1. 
162 Ibid, Title II, §1, 4. 
163 Titles 3, 6; 6, 16; 26, 2; and 30, 4 discussed above. 
164 Despite this extensive category, Forbes still includes a separate entry on deforcement: Forbes, Institutes, 
Book V, Chapter III, Title II. 
165 And here leasing-making is mentioned, Ibid. Title II, §2, 1. Leasing-making also has its own chapter in the 
earlier entry covering crimes against the Monarchy and the State: Institutes, Part I, Book III, Chapter III. 
166 Forbes, Book IV, Chapter IX, Title II, §2. 
167 Forbes, Institutes, Chapter IX, Title II, Title II, §4. 
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 In Forbes’ structure it is interesting that the only examples of injuries made 
extraordinary by the place of commission are real in nature. This makes sense for written 
injuries as they have no locus; the logic is less clear for verbal injuries. One could argue 
that “raising a fray” during a church service might include a verbal injury, but the natural 
meaning of the word lends itself to a physical altercation rather than slander or insults.168 
Regardless, even if we are to include verbal injuries within the church example it still 
leaves them absent from the situation where judges are sitting in court. Thus, insulting 
someone in the presence of a magistrate would not be considered an aggravation, although 
striking them would. Given the emphasis on honour and reputation, it seems odd that there 
should be such an omission. 
 
 Finally, it should be noted that, aside from those aggravations which took the form 
of a separate crime or fell under the umbrella of a related crime, there was also the 
category of those circumstances which were considered aggravations, but are no longer 
considered so in modern law. Written injuries, discussed above, were treated as the most 
damaging type of injury by Mackenzie and Bayne, but now no longer feature as part of the 
criminal law. Additionally, Mackenzie highlights the related crime of ‘leasing-making’169 
in his title on injuries; the crime of raising hatred and discord between the King and his 
people.170 Mackenzie suggests that ‘infamous libels’ (written injuries) and ‘leasing-
making’ are one in the same: the former was for injury to individuals and punished 
arbitrarily, whereas the latter was for injury to the King and punished capitally.171 Leasing-
making appears to have been used as a heavy-handed form of censorship, one where any 
man engaged in political activities had to be ready to die for their views, and none were 
safe. This appears to have caused controversy, particularly in the political battle between 
Montrose and Argyll in 1639.172 The eventual Union of 1707 resulted in an Act to abolish 
the Scots law of treason, thereby blunting the efficacy of leasingmaking.173 Indeed, by the 
1730 publication of Bayne’s Institutions the punishment for leasing-making had been 
reduced to arbitrary by statute.174 
 
                                                 
168 An earlier passage on affrays, frays and riots suggests that verbal injuries could not be included: 
“Quarrelsom or threatning [sic] words do not, in the judgment of the law, amount to an affray.” Forbes, 
Institutes, Part I, Book III, Chapter XIII, Title II, §2, 1. 
169 Also referred to as ‘leasingmaking’, ‘leasing making’ or ‘leesing making’. 
170 Title 30, 6; Forbes, Book IV, Chapter IX, Title II, §2, 1; Lord Ochiltree (1631) 1 JC 176. 
171 Mackenzie, ibid. 
172 See the circumstances surrounding the case of Argyll v Mr John Stewart (1641) 2 JC 423. See also Lord 
Balmerino (1634) 1 JC 230. 
173 Treason Act 1708.  
174 Bayne, Institutions, Title on Injuries, p.180, para.7. 
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When one considers the fractured nature of these precise legal rules, it becomes 
rather astounding to think that the entirety of this conduct should become subsumed within 
one simple offence. From a practical point of view the distinctions were relatively 
meaningless, since it was common for charges to set out a description of the conduct, as 
opposed to libeling a nomen juris as is done today. The categorisations here therefore 
served mainly to structure each writers’ account. That they structured them in this way is 
particularly telling, because they chose to divide the conduct into quite different categories 
even though there was no underlying narrative of a requirement to use specific terms in 
libels. 
 
1.9 Summary  
 
 Some concluding remarks can be made about the structure of assault in seventeenth 
century Scots criminal law. Using modern terminology, the above analysis demonstrates a 
‘hybrid’ structure; one which utilises a single offence of ‘injuries’ to cover a plethora of 
conduct (including some which would today be classified as delictual, rather than criminal, 
in nature) supplemented by numerous offences which covered specific circumstances 
deemed peculiar enough to warrant separate consideration (such as hamesucken), or 
inclusion under the umbrella of a more serious offence (such as cursing one’s parents being 
considered blasphemy). Within this structure, the base offence of injuries seems to have 
focused on harms to reputation, whereas most forms of violence were restricted to other 
offences, such as mayhem or hamesucken. There was an indication that intention was the 
culpability requirement for the offence, but most of the discussion was centred on each 
commentator’s response to verbal injuries specifically. As a result, it seems that situations 
of contumely or slander were the driving force behind much of the basis of the law on 
injuries.  
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2. 1750 – 1850: Structural Development Under Iniuria 
 
2.1 Iniuria Terminology and the Basis of Liability  
 
 The overt influence of the Roman legal tradition could be seen right up until the 
time of Hume. Indeed, even Erskine’s Institutes, only fifty years removed from Hume’s 
Commentaries, still spoke of iniuria as being the basis of liability, divided into the same 
sub-categories of verbal and real.175 We can see that by this stage the notion of physical 
injury being trite had started to wane, now making up the primary example of real injuries 
as Erskine understood them.176 Further, and conversely, verbal injuries are noted as 
carrying merely a pecuniary fine or, in some circumstances, penance. Of interest, there 
seems to be some theoretical shift towards the concept of ‘aggravated assaults’ by the 
inclusion of mutilation, demembration and hamesucken within one category of “crimes 
directed against a man’s limbs… without any intention of killing”.177 
 
Erskine relies heavily on the seventeenth century writers: for example, he appears 
to copy Mackenzie almost verbatim when he states that written injuries are “of all others 
the most public and permanent… it ought to be punished by the judge with greater severity 
than the slighter injuries”.178 However, and in contrast to other commentators of the ius 
commune tradition, Erskine tells us that: “Scandal, reduced into writing and published, 
may be considered rather as a real than a verbal injury”.179 This statement is peculiar as it 
suggests that injuries had to fall within either of the real or verbal sub-categories. This 
would, however, be at odds with the essence of the ius commune of which Erskine 
purported to follow, which maintained a clear distinction between written/printed material 
versus oral material and other physical acts which were ‘real’.180  
 
It is also interesting when considered within the context of the next line, that 
because written injuries are “of all others the most public and permanent, [they] ought to 
                                                 
175 Indeed, he almost copies Mackenzie verbatim when he states that written injuries are “of all others the 
most public and permanent… ought to be punished by the judge with greater severity than the slighter 
injuries.” Erskine, Institute, IV, 4, 81; cf. Mackenzie, MC at Title 30, 5. Rather curiously, Erskine treats 
writing as an example of a real injury; Erskine seems to suggest that this is because real injuries are dealt 
with more harshly, 
176 Erskine, Institute, IV, 4, 81.  
177 Ibid at 4, 50. 
178 Erskine, Institute, IV, 4, 81; cf. Mackenzie, MC at Title 30, 5. See also Erskine’s treatment of mutilation 
and demembration which seems to follow the work of Seton, albeit far more briefly: IV, 4, 50.  
179 Erskine, IV, 4, 81.  
180 Blackie, “Defamation” at pp.644-645, citing A Matthaeus’s tripartite ‘vel re, vel verbis, vel literis’ {‘Either 
by act, words, or writings’}.  
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be punished… with greater severity”.181 In other words, if injuries with more permanence 
in the world are to be considered more severe, and if writing (seen as the most permanent) 
is to be considered a real rather than a verbal injury, it therefore follows that real injuries 
generally must be more severe. The verbal/real categorisation therefore goes beyond 
natural meaning (i.e. the method used) to consider the resulting harm. 
 
Blackie, however, would appear to disagree with this assessment. He argues that 
classification was by mechanism used and not by result; it is for this reason that real injury 
was not confined to physical injury at this stage.182 He states that there were three reasons 
for classification by mechanism: that the mechanism employed was relevant to the level of 
punishment; that the mechanism had implications for the relative relevance of truth;183 and 
that it might determine matters of jurisdiction.184  
 
This analysis suggests that ‘verbal’ and ‘real’ were only to be understood by their 
natural meanings, and it is clear from the sources that the words formed part of a much 
more complex construct. To illustrate; if iniuria refers to the contemptuous harassment of 
another then it should be irrelevant how such harassment came about – both physical and 
verbal attacks can invoke the distress, anger and humiliation envisaged by the concept to a 
comparable degree, particularly where the benchmark is based in terms of an affront to 
one’s fame or honour. That such a distinction was nevertheless present in the law and had 
an impact on the level of punishment shows this not to be the case.  
 
Further, Blackie’s reasoning for classifying by mechanism appears rather ingenuous 
– it can equally be used to demonstrate that it was the results which dictated the 
categorisation. For example, using the fact that real injuries were not confined to physical 
injuries as evidence of categorisation by mechanism is not very effective since a wide 
range of conduct could equally show that what was relevant was not the type of action 
committed, but rather the degree of seriousness – the argument for classification by 
mechanism would be more persuasive if the categories were strictly within those bounds. 
Further, each of the reasons he gives presupposes an understanding of the terms ‘verbal’ 
and ‘real’ which goes beyond their natural meaning. That categorisation by mechanism was 
                                                 
181 Erskine, IV, 4, 81.  
182 J Blackie, “Defamation” at p.645. 
183 I.e. the truth of the defamatory statement only being a valid defence in cases of verbal injury.  
184 J Blackie, “Defamation” at p.645.  
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relevant to punishment necessarily entails that the words have some correlation with 
sentencing – a notion which does not exist beyond the nuanced realms of criminal theory. 
 
Indeed, the idea that the mechanism employed was relevant to the level of 
punishment is not inconsistent with Erskine’s view at all; Erskine recognised that injuries 
committed via one mechanism (written words) were more serious than those committed by 
another (verbal), and therefore classified written injuries as a type of real injury, 
recognising that such injuries invoked harsher levels of punishment. The example Blackie 
gives himself, of Mackenzie distinguishing infamous libels from verbal injuries based on 
the former’s permanence and involvement of greater design,185 impliedly recognises that 
verbal injuries were punished more leniently, once again providing evidence for a 
definition which goes beyond the mechanism which labels the category. Likewise, the 
notion that the category might determine matters of jurisdiction once again suggests a scale 
based on severity, rather than pure mechanism, as the Commissary courts had exclusive 
jurisdiction over verbal injuries,186 and Blackie himself has noted that questions of 
jurisdiction were used as a way of roughly dividing according to the potential seriousness 
of the iniuria.187  
 
It should be stressed that the present argument is not an attempt to dismiss the clear 
link between the type of conduct and its resulting category. Rather, it is a rejection of the 
idea that categorisation by mechanism represented the only understanding of iniuria. It is 
disingenuous to ignore the clear correlation between the two categories and the resulting 
harm, highlighted by the fringe case of written injuries which could have justifiably fallen 
into either category – it is telling that both Erskine and Mackenzie thought it necessary to 
explain why written injuries should be considered separately from their verbal 
counterparts. 
 
2.2 The Anglicisation of Scots law 
 
Bankton, a contemporary of Erskine, also recognised the law of injuries as being 
“to the reproach and grievance of another, whereby his fame, dignity or reputation is 
hurt”,188 thus echoing Ulpian’s tripartite of interests which make up the delict of iniuria: 
                                                 
185 Mackenzie, MC, Title 30, 5. 
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187 Blackie, “Unity in Diversity”, p.76.  
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corpus, fama, and dignitas.189 Despite not referring to corpus explicitly in his definition he 
does include bodily invasions under injuries; it is likely that the concept of ‘dignity’ was 
taken to have been infringed in cases of physical injury. Assault, at a basic level, was still 
very much understood in ius commune terms. Unlike his predecessors, however, Bankton’s 
account was far less descriptive, relying less on arbitrary examples and more on basic 
principles of liability. He therefore provided no examples of verbal injury, instead outlining 
the results necessary to constitute the injury: thus words that affected the “life, liberty, 
estate, reputation, trade or profession”190 of the victim would constitute the offence. This 
represents a substantial change from the seventeenth century, and a move towards a set of 
guiding principles rather than arbitrary commands.  
 
Additionally, Bankton’s account appears to capture a turning point where Scots law 
started to feel the effects of anglicization, moving away from the civilian tradition of the 
ius commune. Indeed, Bankton distinguishes between an ‘assault’191 and ‘battery’ in much 
the same way that modern English law does, so that striking someone was considered 
battery and an assault, a word previously used exclusively in the military sense of a raid on 
a position,192 is here identified as making threatening gestures, such as raising a fist or any 
weapon.193 Thus, ‘injury by facts’, otherwise known as real injuries, include striking 
someone which is a “high injury to his person”, capable of being “more or less atrocious” 
depending on the circumstances of the case.194 The reference to real injuries being more or 
less atrocious is particularly interesting as he does not explicitly mention mutilation or 
demembration.195 Instead he focuses on the concept of injuries being “increased, or 
diminished” telling us that an injury could be aggravated by the use of an instrument, from 
the character of the person, or from the place where the injury was committed.196 Good 
intentions (such as a teacher scolding a pupil) could minimise the punishment.  
 
Further, although verbal injuries were still considered in terms of iniuria, we start to 
see some development from its seventeenth century treatment; we are told that although 
usually heard in the courts of the Commissars, the damages may likewise be sought in the 
Court of Session where the injury is atrocious or where the victim was a person of 
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character.197 By the end of the eighteenth century the normal civil courts had jurisdiction in 
defamation actions,198 bringing the two types of iniuria yet further away from each other, 
and thus by the time Hume is writing he tells us that cases of slander, whether spoken or 
written, had “very seldom been prosecuted in the Criminal Court”.199 
 
2.3 Injuries and ‘Assault’ Under Hume 
 
Baron David Hume, writing in 1797, stated his desire to rescue Scots law from 
being consumed and overwritten by English law and practice.200 Hume was an upholder of 
the distinctness and merits of Scots law, being critical of its English counterpart which, 
given his massive influence on the development of Scots law, perhaps goes some way to 
explaining how Scots law was able to maintain its uniqueness from the ever-looming threat 
of complete anglicization. The publication of Hume’s Commentaries marked a transition in 
Scots law as it finally reached maturity from the Romanistic approach of Mackenzie’s 
time, which had been followed by selective borrowing from English practice.201 
 
In Hume’s Commentaries, the term ‘real injuries’ was still being used as a 
categorical heading, but its meaning was now limited to varying ways in which the 
physical integrity of the victim was compromised. Thus, it is at this point in history that 
‘real injuries’ moves from being a crime of reputation to a crime of violence. Blackie 
points out that the law still adopted a ius commune approach of understanding injuries in 
terms of iniuria,202 illustrated by Hume’s recognition of cases involving “slighter acts of 
violence… more of contempt and indignity, than of a purpose to do bodily harm”.203 
However, even contumelious injuries were now couched in terms of being, or alluding to, 
physical acts of harm, rather than merely affronting one’s honour.204 Thus, we are told that 
ordinary injuries were “various in kind and degree”, being broken down into the sub-
categories of “assault, invasion, beating and bruising, blooding and wounding, stabbing, 
mutilation, demembration, and some others”, with Hume pointing out that the competency 
                                                 
197 Bankton, I, X, 24. 
198 Affleck v Gordon (1755) Mor 7348; Forrest v Crichton 12 Dec. 1807 FC.  
199 Hume, Commentaries, p.340. 
200 Baron David Hume, Commentaries (1797)(1986 Reprint with introduction) at p.iii-iv. 
201 TB Smith, British Justice: The Scottish Contribution (1961) at p.95. 
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203 Hume, Commentaries, Book I, Chapter IX, 7, p.332 (all references are to Book I, Chapter IX unless 
otherwise stated).  
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of a prosecution would nevertheless be unaffected if an injury either did not fall under one 
of those headings or could not be defined within a single phrase.205  
 
2.4 Stellionatus as the Foundation for Assault as an Attack 
 
Where none of the recognised terms of style were applicable, the injurious conduct 
would be libelled as ‘stellionate and real injury’. Hume states that “[w]e have… in our law, 
the general term of stellionate, borrowed from the Roman practice, which may be 
employed in such a case, along with the full description of the injury”.206 Thus, James 
Campbell was charged on 22 January 1722 with “stellionate and real injury” along with a 
description of the injury inflicted which involved stripping and tying down the victim 
when he was intoxicated and applying hot coals to his “privities”.207 There is no indication 
from Hume’s treatment that such an injury had to be severe, but Alison states that a charge 
of stellionate and real injury was a separate offence (from assault), and one that could be 
charged instead of an aggravated assault in cases of mutilation,208 and Anderson states that 
the term was used to denote a real injury “of a serious nature, such as severe burning, 
thrusting needle into the eye, or any grave injury which took effect internally, as through 
the operation of drugs”.209 Indeed, the limited cases noted in the literature suggest a trend 
towards its use in cases of more serious injury to the person.210  
 
What is most peculiar about this separate offence is that its origins appear rather 
obscure. Hume tells us that it is borrowed from Roman practice, but stellionatus was 
understood as ‘swindling’ in Roman times, the primary example being ‘double dealing’ 
where one dispones the same right twice.211 Ulpian hints that the term might be used in a 
more general sense when he states that: “in the absence of a specific offence, this charge 
can be brought, and there is no need to list the instances”,212 but if this is indeed the 
passage being relied on later by Hume it is certainly odd that he should contradict it by 
asserting the requirement to list the instances in the libel. Mackenzie described the need for 
                                                 
205 Hume, Commentaries, 5, p.328. 
206 Hume, i,328.  
207 Ibid at footnote 1.  
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a charge of stellionatus as a necessary response to the fact that “cheats… multiply and vary 
themselves into so many forms that legislators were forced to invent this general name” 
and stressed the requirement that the person charged must have done something 
fraudulently (fecerunt).213 Forbes echoes Mackenzie, stating that it is a general term 
signifying “any crime committed by fraud wanting a more particular name”.214 Both point 
out the etymology of stellio, which is a type of lizard with ‘starry spots’ and a subtle 
nature, presumably implying an emphasis on deception.215  
 
There was therefore precedent in Scots law for this term to be used in criminal 
situations where a prior existing term did not suitably cover offending conduct which had a 
fraudulent element. Despite this fact there is only one example, dated before Hume’s 
Commentaries, of the term stellionate being used in the Scottish courts in a context other 
than the traditional Roman sense of double dealing,216 and that is the aforementioned 
Campbell case from 1722, as noted by Hume.217 Likewise, there are only two (historical) 
instances of stellionate being used in a sense other than double dealing after the publication 
of Hume’s Commentaries, and neither are concerned with real injury.218 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, by the publication of Macdonald’s Practical Treatise on the 
Criminal Law of Scotland in 1867, the term had become “nearly obsolete”.219 The term 
resurfaced briefly in 1984 when the passage from Hume was cited by Lord Avonside in 
response to an argument that the causing of real injury by supplying glue inhalation kits to 
young people was not a crime “which is known to the law of Scotland”;220 and then again 
much more recently in Principal Reporter v N221 where the sheriff stated that stellionate 
“means deceit and was the name given to any crime involving dishonesty or real injury not 
covered by any recognised nominate crime... Some form of deceit is essential to the 
crime.”222  
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We can conclude that, from the time of Hume onwards, in circumstances where the 
conduct was not an attack in the overt sense (i.e. a direct confrontation), prosecutors felt 
uncomfortable using ‘assault’ or similar terms in the libel, instead opting first to use 
‘stellionate and real injury’, and later just ‘real injury’.223 It is interesting that prosecutors 
felt such a distinction was necessary despite Hume’s endorsement of assault as being a 
crime robust enough to include such conduct within its remit. The result is that the term 
‘assault’ became more synonymous with a direct attack, whereas real injury was reserved 
for situations not quite fitting this description. Nevertheless, it is regrettable that the exact 
parameters of the real injury offence and its interaction with assault have never been fully 
debated. Indeed, when Gordon suggests that pouring poison down a sleeping man’s throat 
would be an assault, it might equally be charged as (stellionate and) real injury.224 
 
2.5 The Prominence of Violence in Eighteenth Century Assault 
 
An assault therefore had to be an overt attack against a person. As with Bankton, 
‘assault’ in Hume’s definition of injuries was to be understood in a broader sense as a 
nominate term for an attack, as opposed to its specific lay meaning which limited its 
previous use to discussions of hamesucken.225 However, and unlike Bankton, Hume does 
not appear to have adopted wholesale an anglicised understanding of the term assault. The 
obvious difference is that the term ‘battery’ is scarcely used in Hume’s treatment,226 and 
thus ‘assault’ covered both the threat and infliction of harm.  
 
It is also unclear how far insulting behaviour was recognised as an assault by 
Hume. As noted above, Hume’s approach to assault and real injury appears to have 
included the types of iniuria which would have been previously categorised as verbal 
injuries, so that slighter acts which were contumelious in nature, rather than violent, could 
still be charged as an assault. However, each of Hume’s examples includes violence as an 
essential element, seemingly contradicting the notion that an assault could be only 
‘contumelious’ or undignified in nature. William Campbell was found guilty of a ‘slight 
                                                 
223 Which, in the examples of the drug administration cases is perhaps more understandable since historically 
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assault’ for threatening  , before cutting her clothes off and taking her by the shoulders and 
pushing her down stairs;227 and at the trial of William Irvine of Gribtown, the Lords chose 
only to proceed to trial on a charge of beating, cutting, and blooding, finding that the 
remaining charges should be prosecuted in other “civil or criminal” courts.228 These were 
charges of “personal struggle and throwing to the ground, accompanied with scurrilous and 
threatening words”.229 
 
Indeed, the only example of a contumelious assault at this time nevertheless 
involved physical contact with the victim, as where the victim was spat on.230 Even then 
there was still uncertainty as the victim was referred to as being either “assaulted or 
injured”.231 There is authority to suggest that merely spitting at the victim could constitute 
an assault, but in that case the Lord President stressed that the jury should first be satisfied 
that “the parties were so near each other that it might have done so, or probably did do 
so”.232 
 
There was therefore a focus on impending violence; but the infliction of harm was 
not essential. Thus, riding horseback towards a person causing fear and alarm could 
constitute assault even without physical contact,233 just as a missed shot from a gun could 
constitute an aggravated assault.234 The threshold was menacing or threatening gestures of 
violence, irrespective of how real the gesture was, so that levelling a gun which was not 
primed, and without any attempt to pull the trigger, was a good basis for a conviction for 
assault,235 but words alone were not.236 
 
Indeed, if criminal assaults were intended to cover the types of contumelious 
approaches that slander and embarrass (rather than physically harm) the victim, then it 
would be pointless to include a separate chapter on offences against reputation.237 It seems 
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to the present author more likely that, against a historical background of the ius commune 
and iniuria, Hume was documenting a practical development in how assault was 
understood in the criminal legal system. As Blackie has pointed out, iniuria was always 
capable of encompassing physical acts not carried through to impact on the body,238 but the 
understanding of these acts within the context of criminal liability changed as the term 
‘assault’ became the prominent category adopted within the legal system.239 In 
circumstances where the terms ‘iniuria realis’ and ‘assault’ were to be treated as synonyms 
and the procedural system had adopted jury trials, it became necessary to explain to the 
jury that non-impacting injuries were also an ‘assault’, because under ordinary meaning 
they were not.240  
 
Non-impacting injuries were therefore understood as threats of violence rather than 
as insult or affront, and for the first time ‘assault’ gained its own technical meaning within 
the legal system. Under this specialised meaning, it was not necessary that the person be 
struck, it was sufficient that they had been “put in dread or apparent danger of bodily 
injury”.241 The law in this area was therefore evolving to focus on the violence element 
over the disgrace or embarrassment caused to the victim, which was now seen as inherent, 
but not necessarily criminal. If this violent element was lacking from the pannel’s conduct 
there was either no criminal liability, or it was a crime or delict of a different nature.242 
 
2.5.1 The Fusion of Assault and Mayhem 
 
Perhaps the most important change which precipitated the move from assault’s 
focus on reputation to violence is in the development of mayhem from a distinct crime to 
an extension of assault itself. Blackie has suggested that by the early nineteenth century the 
use of old sub-categories based on the nature of the impact on the body had withered away, 
relying on a passage from Hume where he observed, in the context of mayhem, that 
“laying aside such idle debates… our judges now look to the degree of the injury”.243 In a 
discussion about whether mayhem was a capital crime, Hume concludes that the 
appropriate punishment was arbitrary, citing a case where the court rejected the argument 
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for capital punishment for the “invading, wounding and mutilating of the Bishop of 
Orkney”.244 As a result, Hume states that it is “needless to engage in those numerous and 
minute controversies… respecting the several parts of the human frame, how far they are 
to be reputed distinct members of the body” and that we should lay “aside all such idle 
debates”, referring to the (arduous) process of determining what constituted a ‘member’ for 
the purposes of a valid charge of mayhem.245 This process was no longer necessary where 
injuries of mayhem were punished in line with other injuries, namely arbitrarily, with the 
judge looking to the degree of the injury to determine punishment.  
 
However, suggesting that there was a reduction in the use of sub-categorical terms 
for degrees of harm, based on this evidence, seems a step too far. First, it is not altogether 
clear that arbitrary judges ever did anything other than look to the degree of injury when 
passing sentence. Second, if the degree of injury was all that mattered for constructing a 
libel, there would have been no need for use of the term ‘stellionate and real injury’ to 
cover those cases where the mode of committing the injury was unorthodox. Rather, it 
seems more likely to be evidence that the specific category of mayhem, which had until 
this point been considered a unique offence, was now subsumed within the general injuries 
offence.  
 
From that perspective, Blackie is correct in the sense that the inclusion of mayhem 
caused ‘assault’ to become one over-arching offence ranging from relatively minor to 
serious injury. Mayhem aside, this is not entirely dissimilar to how the law in this area had 
been operating for centuries; before ‘assaults’ were varying types of ‘real injuries’. The 
inclusion of mayhem therefore presented an even greater incentive to utilise sub-
categorical terms, particularly in the context of sentencing where a nebulous term like 
‘assault’ would otherwise fail to distinguish different types of attacks. Indeed, it is clear 
from the case law cited by Hume that libels still regularly included terms like ‘invading’, 
‘wounding’ ‘beating’ and ‘to the effusion of blood’.246 
 
2.5.2 Culpability for Assault 
 
Another archaic term which still found favour in the nineteenth century referred to 
the mental element in assault, which was, as with iniuria, understood to be the requirement 
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of ‘animus iniuriandi’ or an intention to cause injury.247 There had been little attempt to 
review this principle in either the institutional writings or the cases since even before 
Mackenzie and such principles were recognised; it seems to have always been taken for 
granted that an injurious intention was required.248 Blackie highlights that the only case 
during this period which might have provided opportunity for analysis – as where a man 
was trampled by one rider after moving to avoid another – merely stated that if the facts as 
charged were established, there would be liability.249 There was therefore a focus on the act 
and any resulting consequences, from which intention could be inferred if the former were 
proved. Thus, when a boy whipped a horse causing it to throw and injure its rider, the court 
found little difficulty in repelling the argument that there was no “violence intentionally 
directed against the person”, holding that there could be “constructive intention”.250 
 
2.6 Towards a Systemised Approach to Aggravations 
 
There was also a theoretical development towards the modern understanding of 
aggravations and their relationship to assault as the simple crime (as opposed to injuries 
and other self-contained types of harm) in the nineteenth century. Alison confirms 
Scotland’s single offence approach by stating that assaults were of “various degrees of 
atrocity, according to the intent of the guilty party, the degree of injury which he [had] 
inflicted, and the quality or situation of the person assailed”.251 Indeed, Alison tells us that 
it had become usual to charge assault in every case of personal violence that did not result 
in death, and to state the serious parts of the crime as aggravations of the simple crime.252 
Hume, by contrast, maintained a division between those attacks “subject to a precise and a 
severe punishment, in virtue of special statutes, which have raised them above their rank at 
common law” versus others which only warranted “some inferior correction”.253  
 
There were therefore two types of aggravation – those specific instances created by 
statute, and those recognised by the arbitrary judge as increasing the severity of an attack. 
Hume therefore recognised the hybrid nature of Scots law during this time – ancient 
statutory offences maintained a hierarchy within an emerging single offence that 
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increasingly viewed the theoretical starting point as any attack on a person. By 1832 Alison 
claimed that such statutes were no longer used in practice, a “beneficial consequence” of 
charging assault in cases of personal violence.254 This could explain why his approach is 
far more streamlined than that of Hume.  
 
The residual statutory offences tended to deal with injuries aggravated by the 
character of the victim, including the beating or cursing of parents,255 the protection of 
judges from fear or harm,256 and for maintaining the personal security of the clergy.257 This 
latter aggravation represented a reaction to the on-going religious “schism” between the 
Presbyterian and Episcopal establishments who incited violence in their members. 
Additionally, ‘invading or pursuing’ any of the King’s officers in the exercise of their duty 
could aggravate an assault,258 and it seems that the same was true for any assault 
committed by a husband on his wife.259 
 
Likewise an assault could still be aggravated by the locus if it involved the King; 
assaults in his presence or his chamber were still considered forms of treason under 
statute,260 and this seems to have extended even as far as a mile from the palace in the case 
of Walter Graham in 1603.261 Hamesucken was still understood as a distinct, capital 
offence against the person and was therefore treated separately,262 although in his 
discussion of assault Alison tells us that it was now common practice to include an 
alternative charge of aggravated assault in case of a failure to prove that the housebreaking 
was committed with intent to assault.263 In a similar manner it was a species of aggravated 
assault to attack a person in their home after first entering with no intention to do so, 
having then been provoked.264 
 
                                                 
254 Alison, i, 181.  
255 Hume, i, 324; Alison, i, 196; James Alves (1830) 5 D. & A. 147.  
256 Hume, i, 326; Alison, i, 193.  
257 Hume, Commentaries, pp.324-326. 
258 Ibid at 326 where Hume treats it is punishable by death, but cf. Alison, i, 194 citing the case of David 
Barnet and John Brown (1820) who were sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment. See also the 
treatment of deforcement in Hume, i, 386ff and Alison, i, 491ff.  
259 Alison, i, 196; John Shaw (1823) & Benjamin Ross (1824), both Alison, i, 197. 
260 Although considered under the heading of real injuries; Ibid at p.327: “punishable with the pains of 
treason”.  
261 Ibid.  
262 Hume, i. 330; Alison, i, 195.  
263 Alison, i, 197; David Robertson Williamson (1853) 1 Irv 244.  
264 Ibid. See also Alex Macdonald and John Fraser (1818) Hume, i, 318. 
52 
 
Other types of aggravations recognised around this time, namely those assaults 
made more severe either by the injury caused, the use of a weapon, or the intention of the 
accused to commit a further crime, were subject to arbitrary punishment265 and therefore 
discussed by Hume within the context of ‘ordinary injuries’. As aforementioned, crimes 
where the injury inflicted was severe, such as mutilation, were now treated as “an 
aggravation of the simple crime”266 (of assault), to be recognised by the judge 
administering arbitrary punishment.267 Likewise, the use of a weapon in and of itself could 
increase the severity of the offence; Alison gives examples where the resulting injury was 
serious, or the victim’s life endangered, but Hume points out that even in cases where no 
such bodily harm ensues, the use of a weapon could be used to infer an intent to kill which 
could aggravate the assault on the basis that the individual had suffered “in being put in 
fear of his life”.268 
 
Perhaps the greatest development during this period is the recognition of assault 
with intent crimes. Before this point assaults were seen as factual elements to more severe 
offences such as homicide, rape or theft.269 By the nineteenth century, however, there 
emerged a trend of charging the lesser crime of assault with an aggravation, so that the 
accused might still be found guilty where the jury were not convinced of an intention to 
commit a further, more serious offence.270 Thus, an intention to kill, to ravish, to rob, or to 
extort a deed could all aggravate a simple assault.  
 
The transition represented a procedural response to an inadequate substantive law: 
Scots law was yet to develop a working theory of attempts, so that in some cases the 
attempted crime was not indictable (as with theft),271 and in others the completed crime 
would be libelled along with an assault with intent (as with rape).272 Equally, and even 
after the development of attempt theory, the chances of securing a conviction were far 
                                                 
265 Not to be understood as lenient; arbitrary punishment could include scourging and banishment: see Hume, 
i, 331; Alison, i, 179 (transportation).  
266 Alison, i, 196.  
267 Hume, i, 324 & 330-331.  
268 Ibid, i, 329; Alison, i, 179 & 181. 
269 Blackie, “Unity in Diversity”, p.107. 
270 Alison, i, 181.  
271 Walter Duthrie Ure (1858) 3 Irvine 10.  
272 Walter Blair (1844) 2 Broun 167; Dennis Connor and Edward Morrison (1848) J Shaw 5. This approach 
posed problems where the rape was non-violent (e.g. fraud or coercion): See William Fraser (1847) Ark. 280 
(fraud); John McArthur (1830) Shaw 216 and Bell’s Notes 84 (coercion of a child). In this latter example an 
argument was led to distinguish between assault with intent to rape and an attempt to commit a rape, but 
there appear to be no examples of the latter indictment ever being led at this time. Attempts were not 
enshrined in the criminal law until the passing of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887 under s61. See 
also statements by Lord Hope in HM Advocate v Forbes 1994 JC 71 at 74.  
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greater when the jury could convict of a lesser crime if they were not convinced beyond all 
reasonable doubt of the greater crime, under the circumstances of the case.273 This 
procedural reality is present to this day in our criminal law. 
 
2.6.1 Weapons, Intent and Underlying Harm 
 
The close relation between an intention to kill and use of a weapon is perhaps 
revealing about the emerging understanding of resulting harm as a gradient. Hume never 
explicitly states that using a weapon would, in and of itself, aggravate an assault. He only 
discusses the use of weapons within the context of assaulting with an intent to kill, giving 
examples of missed sword thrusts and gun shots as being an aggravated species of 
assault,274 on the basis that they endanger life. Likewise, although Alison explicitly states 
that an assault would be aggravated “if it be committed with bludgeons or other offensive 
and lethal weapons, and still more so if to the effusion of blood and danger of life”,275 the 
focus appears to be on the weapon’s ability to endanger life. Indeed, under Alison’s 
heading of aggravations by use of a weapon, several of the examples do not feature any 
weapon at all; what seems to have been essential was the danger to life.276 Further, his 
understanding of fire-arms was such that he saw their discharge as being almost 
synonymous with an intent to kill.277 It should be pointed out that Hume does state that 
even an attack with a non-mortal weapon such as a cane, whip, or baton could be 
actionable in the Court of Justiciary,278 but here he is talking about the de minimus rule for 
simple assault – not aggravations. Thus, the implication is that what mattered was the 
preservation of life, and an emerging understanding that harm could be linked with 
severity.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
273 Alison, i, 184.  
274 Hume, i, 329 (“shooting at, or thrusting with a sword”). 
275 Alison, i, 181 (emphasis added).  
276 Alison, i, 182: Neil Macilroy, 21 November 1825 (kicking a pregnant woman in the belly and striking her 
on the back); Peter White, Perth, 1827 and Robert Butter, 7 December 1829 (seizing child by the neck and 
throwing them down stairs); John Shaw, Glasgow, 1823 (brutal assault on his wife causing haemorrhaging). 
In modern Australian law there are discussions about whether a clenched fist can be considered a weapon: J 
Schreiber et al, “Kings to Cowards: One-punch Assaults” (2016) 44(2) JLM&E 332 at 334. 
277 Alison, i, 179.  
278 Hume, i, 331. See also Ewing v Earl of Mar (1851) 14 D. 314 where riding horseback towards the victim 
so as to put him in danger and a state of alarm was held to be an assault.  
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2.7 Summary 
 
We have seen that the turn of the nineteenth century marked a transition from the 
iniuria roots of injuries as a crime of reputation, to the new nomen juris of assault as a 
crime of violence. This paved the way for previously separate offences of serious injury, 
i.e. mayhem, to become subsumed within the assault definition. There was still very little 
discussion about the culpability required for assault, save that intention would be presumed 
if the facts in the libel were proved. Aggravations started to display a focus on resulting 
harm as a way of grading assaults, with many of the character based aggravations being 
based in archaism. We shall now consider Hume’s legacy in the current law of assault.  
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3. Assault in the Modern Era of Scots law 
 
 From the mid-nineteenth century onwards the law of assault in Scotland became 
fairly settled, and an attempt shall be made here to summarise the most important aspects 
of this period, and how we understand the law of assault in the modern criminal justice 
system.  
 
 By the end of the nineteenth century ‘assault’ had become the preferred nomen juris 
for any intentional attack upon a person, either seriously threatened or accomplished.279 
There was also now clear consensus that an attack could be indirect, such as where a dog 
was set on the victim, or frightening the horse he was riding to make it rear up or bolt.280 
Other aspects have remained the same, so that menacing or violent gestures alone can 
constitute assault,281 and both the act and result will be considered when evaluating the 
severity of the crime (e.g. where a slight push of the victim caused them to fall off a 
moving train).282 
 
3.1 A Cohesive Structure to Aggravations 
 
Procedural realities and legislative intervention meant that the structure of 
aggravations continued to evolve to become more linear from the late nineteenth century 
onwards. This was in large part facilitated by the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887 
(CP(S)A).  
 
First, section 56 removed many offences, such as hamesucken, from the list of 
capital crimes. As a result, hamesucken proper was brought in line with the alternative 
forms of attacking a person in their home and no longer required to be charged as a specific 
crime.283 The nomen juris is still a competent libel today,284 but what is important for the 
aggravation (in contrast to the distinct offence of hamesucken) is that it takes place in the 
victim’s home, irrespective of the accused’s intentions when they entered.  
 
                                                 
279 Macdonald, p.153; Anderson, p.78; see now Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) 1993 JC 43.  
280 Ibid; Quinn v Lees 1994 SCCR 159.  
281 Atkinson v HM Advocate 1987 SCCR 534; Gilmour v McGlennan 1993 SCCR 837.  
282 Peter Leys (1839) 2 Swin 337, although this kind of conduct might nevertheless be charged as recklessly 
causing injury: see HM Advocate v Harris 1993 JC 150.  
283 For alternative forms, see Macdonald, p.159.  
284 Walker v HM Advocate 2014 JC 154.  
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Beating and cursing one’s parents presumably also lost its status as a capital crime, 
subsumed within the wider category of assaults aggravated by the character of the victim, 
but this is not altogether clear. The timeline reveals some inconsistencies: in 1867 
Macdonald includes beating and cursing parents as a separate category (although he also 
recognises it as a form of aggravated assault);285 in 1887 the CP(S)A removes its status as a 
capital crime; in 1892 Anderson nevertheless includes a separate category for beating and 
cursing parents, still referencing the Act which gave its capital status, but uses past tense 
(“[t]he beating had to be violent”), before stating that it was “unlikely that an offence of 
this nature will ever again be indicted under the statute”.286 In addition to these facts, it 
seems that even before the introduction of the CP(S)A there was a tendency to administer 
lenient sentences in such cases despite the Act advocating the death penalty,287 and indeed 
many assaults would be too slight to fall under the statute.288 Finally, there does not appear 
to be an explanation as to why the crime is no longer a statutory offence.289 Despite these 
limitations, it is clear that from the mid-nineteenth century onwards that the Act ceased to 
operate other than to preface a charge of aggravated assault by providing background.290 
 
Second, section 61 of the CP(S)A essentially introduced attempt theory into Scots 
law – it was now not only competent to libel an attempt to commit any indictable crime, 
but the Act also appears to have clarified that in cases of serious physical injury or death it 
was competent to lawfully convict the accused of both the underlying assault/injurious act, 
along with an aggravation that they intended to cause such serious injury or death.291 In 
general there appears to have been a proliferation of assault with intent crimes; Macdonald 
lists ten different ways an assault may be aggravated by an intention to commit a further 
act.292  
 
As a result, aggravations now formed a complete and coherent structure in Scots 
law, and this structure is still used today. An assault is capable of being aggravated in one 
(or more) of five ways: by the intent, by the ‘mode’ (such as fire-arms, stabbing, or 
throwing acid), by the extent of the injury, by the place of commission, or by the character 
                                                 
285 Macdonald, pp.162 and 159 respectively. 
286 Anderson, Criminal Law of Scotland, p.81. 
287 John Beatson (1836) 1 Swin. 254 at 255 per Lord Moncreiff.  
288 Macdonald, p.163; Hume, i, 324-325.  
289 Gordon, Criminal Law, para.33.19.  
290 E.g. John Beatson (1836) 1 Swin. 254.  
291 Discussed also in Anderson, p.80. 
292 Macdonald, p.156-157. 
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of the victim.293 A sixth form of aggravation was recognised by Macdonald, aggravation by 
previous conviction,294 but this seems to have fallen out of favour by the time Anderson is 
writing as he makes no reference to it, and indeed Scots law now refuses to disclose 
previous convictions before conviction in a majority of cases.295  
 
Of note, aggravation by use of a lethal weapon had, according to Macdonald, 
“properly fallen into desuetude” so that in current practice the use of any form of weapon 
constitutes an aggravation of assault, but cases involving firearms, stabbing or cutting, 
and/or corrosive substances (i.e. weapons that are very likely to cause severe injury) are 
treated as specially aggravated and are therefore not normally charged summarily. 
Similarly, cases where the injury is more severe are treated as aggravated irrespective of 
whether the accused intended to inflict such harm, but in practice their intention will be 
relevant in passing sentence.296 
 
Further, some circumstances where assault is aggravated by the victim’s absolute 
character has been expanded on by legislation (as with officers of the law),297 whereas in 
others the protection appears to have eroded to the point where it may no longer offer a 
valid aggravation.298 Relative character is also still capable of aggravating assault as where 
the child, parent, husband or wife of the accused is the victim,299 or where an officer of law 
assaults his prisoner.300 Finally, assaults aggravated by an intent to commit a further crime 
continue to be competent so that where the actions committed beyond the assault are 
insufficient to warrant a charge of attempt for the more serious crime, an ‘assault with 
intent to X’ is nevertheless competent to charge.301 
 
3.2 Punishment and Sentencing 
 
Punishment for assault continues to be ‘arbitrary’ in the sense that the judge shall 
consider the background or any other relevant circumstances when passing sentence. 
                                                 
293 Macdonald, p.156-162; Anderson, p.80.  
294 Macdonald, p.162.  
295 Nelson v HM Advocate 1994 SCCR 192; Howitt v HM Advocate 2000 SLT 449; ss101(1) and 166(3) 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (hereafter ‘1995 Act’). 
296 Gordon, Criminal Law, para.33.07; 1995 Act, Schedule 3, para. 7.  
297 Originally s42 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967, now repealed and replaced by s90 of the Police and Fire 
Reform (Scotland) Act 2012.  
298 As with judges and others within the legal process: McDonald and Dustan (1872) 2 Couper 174. This is 
probably also true of clergymen.  
299 Gordon, Criminal Law, para.33.19.  
300 Findlater and McDougall (1841) 2 Swin 527.  
301 See generally, Gordon, Criminal Law, paras.33.21-33.29.  
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However, with the development of distinct criminal courts and procedure, this discretion is 
‘split’ with the Crown Office who, when bringing a case against an accused, determine 
which court and under what procedure the case shall be heard. Assault tried in the High 
Court of Justiciary can attract a maximum penalty of life imprisonment; a sheriff sitting 
under solemn procedure can impose a sentence of up to five years’ imprisonment or 
alternatively remit the case to the High Court for sentencing where they deem their 
sentencing powers inadequate;302 and a sheriff sitting summarily can impose a sentence of 
up to twelve months.303 The prosecutor therefore has some degree of influence over 
sentence based on which court they decide to bring the case, and it is certainly questionable 
that this decision should be made by the prosecutor, rather than the guilty party. Taking all 
these competencies together, the punishment for assault therefore ranges from absolute 
discharge to life imprisonment.  
 
3.3 The Culpability Requirement in Assault 
 
We have seen that since its inception, an attack had to be intentional to constitute 
assault.304 However, the development of criminal liability was such that the mental element 
of the crime was now made explicit.305 This is perhaps the most interesting aspect of the 
law of assault as it stands today – animus iniuriandi, latterly intention, appears to have 
always been accepted as the necessary mental element, but there does not appear to have 
been any analysis, in the courts or otherwise, to determine why. This is particularly 
interesting given the historical closeness of physical injury and defamation as concepts in 
the law; one would assume that a dialogue would have emerged to determine the 
underlying principles of each as they evolved and the justification for punishment 
diverged.  
 
This has not been the case, and thus due to this closeness and their origins in iniuria 
these concepts have evolved so that the rationale for one has clearly impacted on the other 
– namely the idea that we should only punish insults that were intentional (of evil design) 
has crept into our understanding of protecting bodily integrity. Arguably, beyond the cut off 
                                                 
302 1995 Act, ss3(3) and 195 respectively.  
303 Ibid, s5(2). A Justice of the Peace Court may also hear cases of assault and can impose a maximum 
sentence of 60 days imprisonment under s7(6)(a) of the 1995 Act, but under s7(8)(b)(iv) they are unable to 
hear more serious cases of assault such as those causing fractures, involving stabbings or those to the danger 
of life, or assaults with intent to ravish. 
304 Or at the least, the circumstances must demonstrate “constructive intention”: Keay (1837) 1 Swinton 543. 
305 Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) 1993 JC 43 at 48 per Lord Justice-Clerk Ross; HM Advocate v 
Harris 1993 JC 150.  
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standard of negligence, intentionality is irrelevant: in society we seek to prevent physical 
injury irrespective of whether it was caused intentionally or not.306  
 
This truth is recognised in modern criminal law, where a majority of advanced legal 
systems treat the protection of individuals’ interests in physical integrity and personal 
autonomy as paramount, embodied by a system of offences against the person which 
penalises even negligently caused injuries in some cases.307 Some jurisdictions give effect 
to this by providing that an assault can be committed intentionally or recklessly,308 whereas 
others prefer to limit assault to an intentional attack, and deal with levels of harm caused, 
both intentionally and recklessly, in separate offences.309  
 
Of interest, South African law also developed under the ius commune tradition, 
much like Scotland, and they also require intention as a prerequisite for assault.310 South 
Africa has cultivated liability on the basis of dolus eventualis, which treats as liability only 
those who intended their conduct.311 By contrast, Germanic law postulated that all harm 
caused was subject to private vengeance or at least restitution, and thus drawing a 
distinction between wrongs done intentionally versus negligently was irrelevant.312  
 
The Scottish approach appears to occupy some hybrid territory between the two – it 
is linear in that it ignores any kind of division based on levels of harm and instead simply 
divides an attack on a person (of any degree) as either intentional or reckless: if the 
conduct is committed intentionally then it is an assault; if it is done recklessly then it is 
                                                 
306 Mackenzie’s defence of ‘distracted persons’ was excluded from the remit of real injuries: see above at 
p.32; for a historical example of reckless injury see HM Advocate v Phipps (1905) 4 Adam 616, and more 
generally see Gordon, Criminal Law, at para. 33.56.  
307 See the MPC in relation to negligent killing: §§211.1(1)(b), 210.4. 
308 Eg. English law: R v Venna [1976] QB 421 (although technically the charge is for ‘assault and battery’, the 
term ‘assault’ is used regularly as an inclusive term); Victoria in Australia also allows assault to be committed 
recklessly under s31 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic); and US law where reckless injuring was prosecuted under then-
prevailing battery statutes: Wellons v State, 77 Ga. App. 652, 48 S.E.2d 922 (1948), and now the MPC 
includes reckless modes of committing assault (§211.1(a) & (b)). 
309 Canadian Criminal Code, Part VIII, section 221 (negligently causing injury); many States and Territories 
in Australia treat assault as an intentional act and include extensive treatment of reckless violence: s35 
(reckless grievous bodily harm (hereafter GBH) or wounding) and s54 (causing GBH) Crimes Act 1990 
(NSW); Division 7A of Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (South Australia); s13 (crimes require intent) 
and s172 (wounding/causing GBH) Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas); s297 (GBH), s301 (wounding and similar 
acts), and s304 (act or omission causing bodily harm or danger) Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 
(WA); Division 3A and s185 (causing harm) Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT); s20 (recklessly inflicting GBH), 
s23 (inflicting actual bodily harm), and s25 (causing GBH) Crimes Act 1990 (ACT); s23 (crimes require 
intent), s320 (GBH), s323 (wounding), and s328 (negligent acts causing harm) Criminal Code Act 1899 
(Qld). 
310 J Burchell, Principles of Criminal Law (4th ed, 2014) at p.575. 
311 Burchell, at p.350-351; at least prima facie, see below at p.62. 
312 Ibid at p.407. 
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libelled as ‘recklessly causing injury’.313 This deviation from the South African (and 
ultimately Roman) approach is perhaps down to earlier and more persistent Germanic 
influences coming to Scotland from England and Europe. An example of this internal 
struggle in Scotland appears as early on as the seventeenth century, as where Mackenzie 
implied that it was no defence to a real injury that the offender was a ‘distracted person’,314 
and later in circumstances where the court arguably warped the meaning of intentionality 
in order to find “constructive intention” in a boy who whipped a horse, causing it to bolt 
and eventually injure the rider. 315  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
313 HM Advocate v Harris 1993 SCCR 559.  
314 See above at p.32. 
315 Keay (1837) 1 Swinton 543. 
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4. Comparative Lessons on Structuring Assault Offences 
 
4.1 The Two-Axes Approach to Structuring Assault 
 
How then, should Scots law give effect to this normative value that protects 
physical integrity? Normative values tend to be given expression in criminal law through 
the lens of guiding principles at the metaphysical level which society determines are 
necessary to ensure balance and fairness in the criminal justice system. On one axis are 
those principles which relate to the function of criminal law as a means of guiding the 
conduct of all members of society (including courts), known collectively as principles of 
legality, or alternatively ‘the rule of law’.316 In contrast, those principles which relate to the 
conditions of liability can be seen as a second, often conflicting, axis; these principles are 
based on the premise that an individual should be held criminally liable only for the 
consequences that were knowingly brought about or risked.317  
 
An example of how these principles interact can be found when we consider the 
fair labelling required under the conditions for liability, and the maximum certainty 
required for adherence to the rule of law within the context of assault.318 Starting from the 
premise that assault should include instances of unintentional violence against the person 
would provide a model example of conduct rules which conform to the principle of 
maximum certainty: it is clear and unambiguous that committing a voluntary act which 
harms another person, irrespective of intention, will attract criminal liability.  
 
In contrast, however, having a single offence of ‘causing physical harm’ would fall 
foul of the principle of fair labelling: this is the belief that the widely felt distinctions 
between various kinds of wrongful conduct in our society should be respected and given 
effect to in law through the subdivision of offences by their nature and the magnitude of 
law-breaking.319 Indeed, one potential criticism of assault in Scots law presently is that it is 
already too broad, so to include all types of violence within one offence definition would 
be inappropriate and offensive: offensive to the offender who recklessly causes someone to 
sustain a black eye who is then placed in the same broad category as someone who 
                                                 
316 See A Ashworth & J Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th ed, 2013) at p.56ff.  
317 Ibid at p.73ff.  
318 See more generally A Ashworth & J Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th ed, 2013) at pp.62-66 and 77-
79.  
319 Ibid at p.77. For a greater treatment see J Chalmers & F Leverick, “Fair Labelling in Criminal Law” 
(2008) 71 MLR 217.  
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intentionally maims their victim;320 and equally offensive to the victim and society as a 
whole who may feel that the severity of the wrong perpetrated by the latter offender is 
undermined by placing his conduct in the same criminal category as that of the former. 
 
4.2 Variation based on Culpability  
 
The above example certainly suggests that we should vary attacks based on 
culpability, in the pursuit of appropriately labelling our offences. There are two 
conventional ways in which this axis can be varied: either in the binary sense that reckless 
conduct is an assault or it is not; or one includes reckless conduct within assault’ ambit and 
then uses culpability as a layering function to increase the severity of all forms of assault 
where intention is present.321  
 
However, the focus on intentionality in our understanding of culpability has 
resulted in an understanding of ‘intention’ in criminal justice systems that can be said to 
abuse the natural meaning of the word. Hadden notes that the current conceptions of 
intentionality in the legal sense are absurd when considered in the context of the word’s 
natural, much stricter, meaning: the current legal requirements amount to little more than 
the negation of certain acquitting defences, along with some minimal notion of having 
foresight of the consequences.322 Indeed, and as aforementioned, the South African offence 
of assault can only be committed intentionally, but their conception of ‘intention’ as the 
necessary mens rea in assault is not dissimilar to how many other legal systems conceive 
of mens rea broadly: as intention or foresight. The South African understanding of 
intention utilises the concept of dolus eventualis to hold that persons, in circumstances 
where no clear intention is present, should, as a matter of fact, have realised that the natural 
and probable consequences of their actions would occur;323 i.e. a textbook definition of 
recklessness. 
 
The result is that intentionality operates less as a sliding axis, and more like a 
binary switch, where conduct which can be said to reach the minimum level of foresight 
required ‘flicks the switch’ to engage criminal liability. This, according to Hadden, is 
                                                 
320 J Horder, “Rethinking Non-fatal Offences against the Person” (1994) 14 OJLS 335 at 342.  
321 This is done to a limited extent in the MPC where, for example, negligently causing bodily injury to 
another with a deadly weapon will constitute simple assault, whereas doing the same “purposely or 
knowingly” will constitute aggravated assault: MPC §211.1(1)(b) and §211.1(2)(b) respectively.  
322 T Hadden, “Offences of Violence: The Law and the Facts” [1968] Crim LR 521 at 532-533.  
323 Burchell, at p.350-351.  
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regrettable because intention is not an instantaneous state of mind, but rather operates 
through time, and so the current conception allows virtually no distinction to be drawn 
between cases of premeditation and impulse.324 As a result, Hadden believes that 
intentionality should take account of premeditation – including this concept in our 
understanding of culpability would allow this flick-switch to be replaced by degrees of 
liability, distinguishing those actions which were committed in the heat of the moment 
from those which were deliberated and calculated.325  
 
Hadden’s approach would therefore move the criminal law from an action-centred 
theory of criminal liability to one based primarily on culpability. Instead of being asked 
whether or not the accused intended to kill or to inflict an injury, the jury would be 
required to assess the extent to which their action was planned, impulsive or unintended, 
and equally whether they had been culpably reckless with respect to a specific result.326 To 
the criticism that the difference between planning and impulse is simply a question of 
degree (i.e. it would be hard to identify fixed, separate culpability categories), Hadden 
responds that the distinctions between intention, recklessness and negligence are no 
different. 
 
Hadden’s premeditation axis theory appears to base its strength on proposition that 
the current approach to culpability is ineffective at having regard to the full spectrum of 
intentionality that can be present in a sequence of events which attracts criminal liability. A 
man can foresee that his argument with another will turn into a physical fight, then be fully 
aware that he is punching someone but completely oblivious to the fact that they will 
thereafter fall and strike their head on the concrete, causing death. There certainly appears 
to be parallels with what Hadden perceives to be an issue with intentionality generally, 
versus the operation of constructive liability, particularly in cases of violence. This topic 
has featured heavily in English legal discourse on offences against the person. There is 
already a great discussion about how an actor should be treated for those results he did not 
intend, when he did intend a lesser injury. Currently s47 1861 Act offences operate in this 
way; the accused must have intended to assault the victim, but there is no mental 
requirement for the actual bodily harm: as soon as such harm occurs, the assault moves 
from the common law and enters the remit of s47. Likewise, the injury that must be 
foreseen in s20 offences can be relatively minor. Some believe this approach is 
                                                 
324 Hadden, op cit. at 523-527.  
325 Hadden, op cit. at 534. 
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unprincipled,327 whereas others argue that persons who threaten or use violence cross a 
moral threshold which makes them responsible for any consequences that they then bring 
about.328 
Constructive liability of course says nothing about the offender’s state of mind 
before or after the conduct giving rise to liability, whereas premeditation would require 
consideration of the whole event to determine the overall culpability. If we take the 
constructive liability argument at first instance, and state that every conduct and result 
requirement should be met by an equal culpability requirement (which would presumably 
be the stance Hadden takes, based on his premeditation theory), then we are left to consider 
what determination of culpability before and after the conduct adds to the criminal process. 
How relevant is it that the offender specifically sought the victim out to confront them in 
the first place; or that they then left the victim to die after committing the attack?  
 
On some levels these considerations are already taken into account when 
determining whether or not the accused had the relevant mens rea for the crime, so how 
precisely would Hadden’s method result in a tangible change in how we approach 
culpability in the legal process? Hadden advocates an approach that focuses on the whole 
situation, rather than binary notions of intentionality and harm, but in his discussions of 
situational considerations being as important as harm considerations, he admits that it 
would be impossible to provide for every possible scenario and degree of legitimacy in the 
law; it is unclear how this would be any different for his expanded degrees of culpability 
under premeditation. Further, in the context of premeditation being a question of degree, it 
is no real answer to respond that the current system is no better – particularly when he 
thinks there is a problem with the current system precisely because intention versus 
recklessness is often treated as a matter of degree. Finally, the introduction of in-depth 
analyses of a person’s state of mind before and after the crime cannot be seen as anything 
other than an assessment of their underlying motives – it is not the role of the law to 
determine whether an actor’s reason for doing something is good or bad as this is purely 
subjective – their role must be confined to determining when they have objectively carried 
out prohibited conduct.  
 
                                                 
327 Law Commission, Offences against the Person and General Principles (1993), Law Com No 218, at 
para.12.26-12.27; J Horder, “A Critique of the Correspondence Principle” [1995] Crim LR 759; Ashworth & 
Horder, Principles, p.76. See also s22(2) of the Criminal Code Act 2002 in the Australian Capital Territory 
which precludes such constructive liability by requiring recklessness in the absence of a fault element for any 
physical element that consists of a circumstance or result.  
328 Gardner, op cit. at 509.  
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The above analysis therefore suggests that the most effective way to vary the 
culpability axis in the assault structure is either by providing a distinction between 
intentional and reckless conduct as separate offences, or alternatively by making 
intentional conduct an aggravating factor of a base crime of reckless injury. It is in this 
respect that Scotland seems to fare relatively well; the clear division of assault from 
reckless injury provides a suitable moral distinction between the two types of conduct, and 
one which is readily understood by the layperson. It additionally avoids the mental 
gymnastics required to understand the concept of intentionality in South African law by 
providing clear separation of intention and foresight. The alternative option invites less of a 
distinction to be made between conduct which is intended versus committed recklessly, 
and this is an undesirable direction. The average person arguably does not think of reckless 
behaviour as being sufficient to constitute an assault.  
 
4.3 Variation based on Results – Hierarchies and Lessons from English Law 
 
We must now consider the utility of a second axis which varies assault based on the 
resulting harm, and see how this would fit within a conception of assault which only covers 
intentional conduct. As aforementioned, the Scots law of assault operates with a single 
offence of assault, which arguably runs contrary to both principles of fair labelling and 
maximum certainty espoused above, while also leaving much of the case to be decided at 
the sentencing stage.329 This is unsatisfactory. English law provides an example of a 
structure based heavily on grading via results. At common law, 330 assault and battery 
occupy the first rung on what is essentially an ‘assault ladder’. The subsequent rungs (i.e. 
more serious offences) are occupied by statutory offences from the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861 (hereafter 1861 Act), starting with assault occasioning actual bodily harm 
(s47), and followed by malicious wounding or inflicting GBH (s20) and finally malicious 
wounding or causing GBH with intent (s18). At the top end of the hierarchy, s18 utilises 
both intentionality and result as the harm inflicted could potentially be the same in 
comparable s18 and s20 cases, but s18 offences (which require intent) carry the much 
longer maximum sentence of life imprisonment, versus the five years under s20. Thus, in 
all but the last rung of the ladder, an assault and its variants can be committed recklessly.  
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4.3.1 Problems with English Law 
 
However, the English approach is far from perfect, and the 1861 Act has been 
described as “archaic” in its use of “redundant verbiage” while “essential specifications are 
left out”; it is preoccupied with “quaint, miscellaneous alternatives [which] are herded 
uncomfortably together with single definitions” leading to interpretations that are “forced 
to ever more absurd technicality in the struggle to maintain a semblance of applicability to 
modern circumstances”.331 There have been numerous attempts to reform this area of law 
spanning nearly forty years, but none have been successful.332 Perhaps the biggest issue 
with the 1861 Act is the lack of continuity in an Act which purports to deliver some 
semblance of structure to offences against the person, and this is caused, in large part, due 
to inconsistencies in terminology. For example, the initial impression is that offences under 
s18 are aggravated versions of s20 offences on the basis that, ceteris paribus, the offender 
intends the injury brought about. However, the offender need only cause GBH under s18, 
whereas under s20 GBH must be inflicted. Not only does this seem to defy common sense 
(an infliction surely imports some sense of intentionality on the act, whereas causing seems 
far more congruent with reckless behaviour), but “inflict” is narrower than “cause”,333 and 
thus while one may cause GBH by passing on an infection or poisoning, they cannot inflict 
GBH in such a way.334 The more culpable offence is therefore of wider scope than the less 
culpable version, with the latter seemingly requiring an element of violence not present in 
the more serious offence.  
 
4.3.2 Reform Proposals  
 
In their 1992 Consultation Paper,335 the Law Commission of England and Wales 
(LC) identified two key elements which made the 1861 Act deficient: ss18, 20 and 47 
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individually offended the rule of law owing to their uncertainty and lack of clarity; the 
sections collectively offended rationality by seemingly eluding any kind of rational 
structure that would conceive of a logical progression in terms of severity.336 We saw an 
example of this lack of rationality above with respect to the relationship between ss18 and 
20. With respect to the rule of law, the current structure has resulted in a series of 
inconsistent or contradictory decisions, based on the fact that the language used has to be 
translated in order to be understood.337 For example the word “maliciously”, found in ss18 
and 20, has been said to add nothing and is best ignored by the Court of Appeal,338 and yet 
the House of Lords has since found that the mens rea of the crime is to be found in that 
very word.339  
 
The LC therefore stressed that offenders be “punished according to the type of 
injury that he intended or was aware that he might cause.”340 As a result, they 
recommended repealing the 1861 Act provisions, and replacing them with a new structure 
that followed a simple and logical progression:  
 
a) A person is guilty of an offence if he intentionally causes serious injury to 
another; 
b) A person is guilty of an offence if he recklessly causes serious injury to another; 
and 
c) A person is guilty of an offence if he intentionally or recklessly causes injury to 
another.341 
 
Recently the LC completed another project on this topic and the proposals were 
substantially the same, save that under offence b), the accused must foresee the risk of 
causing serious injury, and likewise under offence c) the accused must foresee a risk of 
some injury occurring.342 An additional offence of aggravated assault, meaning assault 
causing injury, was created to mirror the original offence c) under the 1992 proposals, 
which carries a lower penalty to reflect the lack of foresight required. The LC’s proposals 
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therefore represent a simple, “logically structured”343 approach to offences against the 
person based on an emphasis on two key scaling elements, culpability and resulting harm. 
The simplicity of this grading system means that harsher injuries will attract harsher 
punishments, and likewise those attacks which are intended will be treated more severely 
than those committed recklessly.  
 
4.3.3 The Importance of Morality 
 
It is, however, on this very simplicity that criticisms of the LC proposals have been 
focussed. Gardner, for example, argues that the LC’s reliance on a lack of rationality and 
respect for the rule of law as the main shortcomings in the 1861 Act structure are flawed.344 
With respect to rationality, he argues that there is cohesion between sections 18, 20 and 47, 
but it requires thinking about these provisions beyond the reductionist viewpoint of only 
considering variations in the configuration of mens rea and resulting harm.345 Rather, per 
Gardner, we should consider the offences in the 1861 Act in separate clusters. Thus, ss18 
and 20 are both crimes of violence, with s20 being the basic offence with infliction as the 
basic mode of causation.346  
 
Gardner argues that by focussing on the wrong instead of the harm, one can clearly 
see the rationality between ss18 and 20; they are crimes of violence. Section 18 is therefore 
justified as being a ‘catch-all’ method for instances of intended violence, lest offenders 
“could otherwise enjoy a bizarre kind of mastery over their own normative situation”, 
capable of avoiding liability by adopting different means.347 Likewise, the requirement of 
actual bodily harm in s47 offences, viewed from the traditional perspective of resulting 
harm, gives the impression that such offences are less serious variants of s20 offences. 
However, under this analysis the requirement for an assault under s47 does not appear to 
have any cohesion with ss18 and 20, and Gardner states that this is precisely because the 
latter offences are concerned with violence, and “assault is not a crime of violence”.348 
Assault is, at its core according to Gardner, the invasion by one person of another’s body 
space and so the LC can be accused of confusing the harm from the wrong.  
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Some elements of Gardner’s reasoning are problematic. Firstly, he talks at length 
about the LC’s misguided view that ss18, 20 and 47 represent a scale ranging from most to 
least severe, but recognises that s18 is a more serious offence than s20, which represents 
the base offence of violence. However, he is only able to justify the reliance on ‘causes’ in 
s18 by reference to recklessness theory; the concept that one should not be able to escape 
the probable and likely consequences of their actions, whatever the means. This might 
make sense if the harm required was greater than under s20 offences, but the harm 
requirement is the same. Thus, we are supposed to merely accept that s18 is the harsher 
crime, but it is wider in scope so that those intending such harm do not escape liability. 
Why should such persons not escape liability? Because the harm caused is so great. The 
wrong is essentially irrelevant in this crime, and Gardner admits as much when he 
highlights that s18 includes the words “by any means whatsoever”.349  
 
Likewise, the distinction he creates between ss18 and 20 on the one hand, and s47 
on the other is pedantic: to exclude violence from our understanding of invading one’s 
personal body space is to remove its meaning almost entirely, particularly when the 
concept of sexual assault already exists to cover those instances of bodily invasion where 
the violent element is missing. If inappropriate touching is correctly understood as a sexual 
assault, what then does that leave for the content of general assault if not violence? Indeed, 
an assault proper under English law is the causing of fear or apprehension in a victim of 
“immediate and unlawful violence”,350 and it is difficult to see how this test could be met 
under circumstances where the victim feared not violence but some other kind of bodily 
invasion, without moving from the objective realm of rationality into the subjective, and 
often irrational, expectations of the particular victim.  
 
At a more fundamental level, however, Gardner’s argument about rationality is 
misconceived because it misinterprets the LC’s broader argument: Gardner believes there 
is rationality in the 1861 Act because s47 belongs to its “own family of offences, namely 
those of assault”;351 the LC believes that no rational coherence exists precisely because 
these offences are split into different, seemingly arbitrary, categories which do not conform 
to our general understanding of offences graded by resulting harm. Even if Gardner is 
correct in his analysis then we still arrive at the result that the 1861 Act groups crimes into 
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‘families of offences’ by some arbitrary distinction based on distinguishing an assault from 
an injury. This is not to say that the LC is correct, but if a distinction is to be made between 
assaults and injuries, it must be based on something more than the artificial notion that 
assault is not a crime of violence.  
 
Indeed, even if we were to concede the point that the 1861 Act has some kind of 
rationality to its provisions, and was not just a piecemeal attempt at summarising the law as 
it stood at the middle of the nineteenth century, it would still be an extremely ineffective 
structural foundation as it creates arbitrary distinctions between types of violent crime that 
cause harm in a legal system which is entirely predicated on the causing of harm: one can 
disagree with the causing of harm as a foundation for liability, but it is certainly ill 
conceived to then reject it for one area of the criminal law when it pervades so readily in 
every other.  
 
Gardner would presumably respond that the above analysis, much like that of the 
LC, represents a misinterpretation of the harm principle. He notes that the harm principle 
states that the law should not be used to restrict or punish harmless activities, and even that 
the law should not restrict or punish harmful activities in ways disproportionate to the harm 
committed, but that the harm principle says nothing about how harmful activities should be 
dealt with by the law.352 Such matters remain to be settled on “other grounds”, but what 
this amounts to is just that on some occasions the law declines to deal with certain harmful 
activities at all (presumably he is referring to instances like sporting activities, voluntary 
surgery, or even the refusal to criminalise alcohol which is a drug and can cause direct and 
indirect damage), or only on certain terms, attaching limitations and provisos and 
conditions to liability which have little to do with the nature or degree of harm.353 This 
analysis, however, is deceptive in that it completely ignores the many instances where the 
harm principle does inform how the law deals with certain activities. Homicide is treated 
more severely than injuries, rape is treated more severely than sexual assault, robbery is 
treated more severely than theft. Gardner’s analysis arguably does more to highlight that 
on some occasions there will be exceptions to the rule, where a competing interest can 
usurp the interest of preventing harm, such as how consent can vitiate certain assault 
charges on the basis that there is no ‘victim’ to be harmed.  
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4.3.4 Descriptions as Providing Substance  
 
It is in Gardner’s second argument, in relation to the rule of law, that one finds a 
more convincing argument. As noted earlier, the second basis that the LC use to justify 
their reforms is the idea that the 1861 Act provisions fail to provide clarity, requiring the 
language to be entirely translated to be considered useable.354 These translations are carried 
out judicially, creating an unacceptable degree of uncertainty in the law.355 Thus, plain 
language is regarded as preferable by the LC, and it is on this point that Gardner disagrees. 
Gardner states that we take it for granted that an interpretational problem for juries and 
magistrates equates to an equivalent problem for society generally in trying to follow these 
rules.356 In some circumstances this is certainly true, as in contract law where textual 
clarity enables parties to make, amend or terminate contracts with redress to the court, but 
Gardner suggests that in the general criminal law textual clarity is an irrelevance; what is 
relevant is moral clarity.357 The presumption that everyone can be said to know the law 
would become untenable if we insist that people can only know the law by its texts, and 
design the law accordingly.  
 
Rather, the law should be designed on the basis of clear distinctions and 
significances which apply outside the law (moral norms, coined by Gardner as “popular 
moral imagination”358), together with clear labelling to inform which clusters of 
distinctions and significances people (moral distinctions) can expect to find replicated in 
the legal context.359 Reliance on the underlying morality of a legal system allows textual 
clarity to be abandoned in general crimes, in favour of concepts which more accurately 
reflect the wrong, or conduct, that the system is trying to prevent. This is because moral 
clarity makes legal rules accessible to the ordinary people who are to be guided by them. 
Phrases like ‘grievous bodily harm’ and ‘actual bodily harm’ represent justified departures 
from textual clarity in favour of moral clarity, because everyone has a shared 
understanding of what these words mean and the relative gravity each phrase imports.360 In 
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some ways, this is more valuable than textual clarity since it is in this moral sense that the 
average person understands and interacts with the law.  
 
Further, Gardner rejects the assumption that we must find definitions for these 
terms which specify all the necessary and sufficient conditions of their application, as it 
results in making the terms unnecessarily technical. This is unnecessary because even 
sound understanding does not dispense with grey areas which are not the product of any 
defect of understanding, but rather part of the concept trying to be understood as with 
‘intention’ in all its incarnations in statute and at common law.361 In their efforts to improve 
clarity then, the LC proposals minimise the number of elements in each offence to in turn 
minimise the possibilities of confusion or uncertainty. The words chosen are likewise 
formed from a limited vocabulary which are morally bland (e.g. causing (serious) injury; 
intentionally; and recklessly). This, of course, is no solution because it offends moral 
clarity in the law.  
 
Undoubtedly the law should maintain its moral character; a feature of good law is 
that it reflects the goals and aspirations of the society it purports to regulate. Yet it is not 
wholly evident that this moral content must be displayed in such a prominent way in the 
dissemination of our legal rules. For example, Gardner asks us to consider that 
interpretational problems may exist for judges and juries without there being an equivalent 
issue for society in general. But this ignores the fact that our criminal legal process is, at its 
core, intended to be a cross-section of society involved in determining criminal justice. The 
jury are the society in any given case, and so any interpretational difficulties they may face 
are directly correlated to the difficulties faced by society generally. It is disingenuous to 
argue that a person does not have to know what the law is until he is sat on the juror’s 
bench, because at that stage the judge will still have to try and educate the jury on the 
terms relevant to the case before them.  
 
Gardner also makes the mistake of equating moral terminology for moral 
substance. It does not follow that because laws are promulgated in clear, descriptive (and 
to Gardner morally vacuous) terms, that persons must suddenly have to know their exact 
contents before they can ‘know the law’. Indeed, as Gardner rightly points out, there is an 
underlying “popular moral imagination” which exists in society to know roughly what is 
and is not acceptable conduct when extrapolated to a legal context. How we then translate 
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this ‘moral imagination’ into “genuine moral distinctions” does not have to be so hard and 
fast. Many of the problems with the LC’s recommendations could be avoided by adding 
categorical titles to each offence, so that intentionally committing serious injury became a 
form of ‘serious battery’, for example, or including multiple ways, in clear descriptive 
terms, of committing an assault as is done in the MPC.362 One can therefore retain morality 
in the law without jeopardising textual clarity. 
 
4.3.5 Conduct as a Third Axis? 
 
The argument is thus that there is something intrinsic in how we describe our 
offences, beyond the requirement of culpability and a resulting harm. Horder also takes 
issue with the LC proposals in relation to their moral content. Whereas Gardner believed in 
an underlying ‘popular moral imagination’ guiding our legal system from the bottom up, 
Horder suggests that it is the moral content of our laws which inform the importance of 
actions in our society, i.e. from the top down. Horder starts by affirming representative 
labelling as a true principle of criminal law that seeks to ensure that the offence definition 
will itself give us an accurate moral grasp of what the defendant has done in committing 
the offence. He states that this moral grasp is important as offence convictions stand as 
enduring features of moral and legal record, publicising exactly how the defendant failed in 
their basic duties as a citizen. 363 It is therefore by ensuring that this moral nominalism 
shapes the definition of offences that one gives the law this necessary moral substance, but 
in the shaping of laws one must be careful of both particularism at one end of the scale, 
and moral vacuity at the other. Horder accuses the LC proposals of moving the law from 
the former end of the scale to the latter, rather than finding the right balance in the middle. 
In terms of the actus reus the only concession to representative labelling in the LC 
proposals is in the nebulous distinction of degree between injury and serious injury, and 
thus there are no longer any qualitative distinctions between kinds of actus rei 
whatsoever.364  
 
There are obvious pitfalls with extreme particularism – very precise specification of 
the modes of responsibility opens up the possibility for exploitation based on technicalities; 
for example, if ‘infliction’ requires violence as Gardner suggests, then one can conceive of 
an argument that the throwing of acid cannot be considered infliction for the purposes of 
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s20, despite it being a suitable candidate for that section. Equally, extreme specification 
involving the distinguishing of injured body parts, as in Seton’s treatment of mayhem, 
results in arbitrary distinctions between those parts included and those left out.365 However, 
Horder argues that a move away from detailed specification of modes by substituting the 
catch-all notion of ‘causes’, and from detailed specification of particular outcomes by 
substituting the catch-all notion of ‘injury’, moves too far in the opposite direction.  
 
Horder states that there are three elements to offences which can impact on the 
moral nominalism we see in crime generally: mode of responsibility (action), outcome 
(results), and intentionality (culpability).366 Serious crimes may feature all three elements, 
as with torture, whereas less serious crimes might feature two out of the three, and less 
serious still might only feature one – as where there is a negative outcome with no 
reference to the required action or intentionality for bringing it about. Horder suggests that 
terms for the mode of responsibility like ‘causes’, and likewise those for the outcome like 
‘personal harm’ or ‘injury’ say nothing of morally nominate import about any of the three 
elements.367 Thus, using both results in morally vacuous offences which can only be 
distinguished by the actor’s culpability.  
 
Horder states that no real argument has been given by the LC for rejecting the use 
of terms in the middle of the spectrum, those rich in detail about the outcome suffered, e.g. 
disable, disfigure, blind etc. Thus, under the LC’s proposed offence of intentionally 
causing serious injury, someone who breaks their victim’s nose is placed in the same 
category as someone who deliberately saws another’s leg off or castrates them.368 He 
argues that it is the function of representative labelling to ensure that such distinctions are 
recognised in the offence committed and not merely at the sentencing stage. He admits that 
the argument is weaker at the lower end of the scale where the threat of technicalities 
burdening litigation has more force for less serious offences, but argues that the more 
serious an offence is, the more important it is, with respect to moral nominalism, to 
incorporate the relevant moral detail into the offence definition.369  
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He highlights that the proposed offence of intentionally causing serious injury fails 
because it is broad enough to cover conduct such as rape and sexual assault; offences 
which are not just factual examples of causing an impact on the body, but also 
representations of unwarranted invasions of a victim’s sexual autonomy, to be valued 
separately from bodily autonomy.370 The ‘moral warrant’ for creating a separate offence is 
that the offence protects an important value whose worth is not merely separable from 
other values, but is partly constituted by its separateness. One therefore diminishes the 
significance of sexual liberation if one treats it as nothing more than a freedom to do with 
one’s body what one wishes.371 There are other values whose worth lies partly in their 
separateness. He argues that there is no way of ‘comparing’ the loss of a leg to blindness, 
with a view to deciding which is more serious. Both losses represent different kinds of 
loss, loss of mobility versus the loss of sight, and the different values involved in each case 
are diminished if their worth is not separately recognised.372 To avoid the pitfalls of 
particularism, focus should not be on particular body parts but on the value which that 
body part could be said to represent.  
 
Horder therefore recommends a structure based on liability where the defender 
castrates, disables, disfigures, or dismembers any other person; or renders them deaf, 
dumb, or blind, damages or removes an internal body part, or “does” any life-threatening 
or potentially life threatening injury.373 Those injuries which do not impinge on any value, 
such as where the defendant breaks a rib or slashes someone’s back with a knife, would be 
treated as qualitatively different and covered by a separate offence which is not dissimilar 
to the LC’s proposal – again in less serious offences the requirement of moral clarity is less 
pressing – although Horder defines injury as including ‘any impairment of physical 
condition’ to explicitly tie those less serious crimes to the value of health and physical 
integrity.374 To accurately reflect those instances with multiple smaller injuries or wounds 
he creates a separate, reimagined offence of battery in an attempt to avoid acquittals for 
repeated, minor injuries and equally to inject some moral meaning into the term ‘battery’, 
which he argues is currently broad enough to include a tap on the shoulder.375 
 
                                                 
370 Ibid at 343.  
371 Ibid.  
372 Ibid. at 344.  
373 Ibid at 345; see also the concept of a ‘living standard’ in A Von Hirsch & N Jareborg, “Gauging Criminal 
Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis” (1991) 11 OJLS 1 at 7ff.  
374 Ibid at 347. 
375 Ibid.  
76 
 
Finally, Horder argues that mental impairment should not be left to piecemeal 
development through the interpretation of existing offence categories, as would be the 
result of the LC proposals, and so creates a separate offence of ‘mental cruelty’ which 
takes ‘impairing another’s mental health’ out of the definition of ‘serious injury’ and gives 
the concept a morally nominative title.376  
 
Horder’s approach has an obvious appeal because morality is so intrinsic to 
criminal law, but it is not immediately obvious that descriptive offences are the only way to 
adequately give recognition to morality in the law. We are merely supposed to take it for 
granted that representative labelling requires the offence definition to provide the necessary 
moral grasp of what an offender has done: this is not self-evident. As with Gardner, there is 
little discussion about the prominent role that offence titles have to play in disseminating 
the morality of the law. Despite Horder’s reliance on offence definitions, one doubts that 
he would argue that the word ‘murder’ alone is insufficient to impart the moral gravity of 
an intentional killing. One also doubts that he would reject that ‘assault’ is sufficiently 
morally charged, and yet an assault is, in many jurisdictions, merely defined as the 
application of force on a person, or causing fear that such force will be applied. There is 
nothing particularly rich in the detail of this offence definition, and yet it is still able to 
accurately impart the moral focus that Horder states is integral.  
 
Indeed, far from enhancing the inherent morality of the law, his reliance on such 
morally rich words in the offence definition arguably diminishes its normative function. 
That is because by making the offence definition as descriptive as he does (in the valiant 
attempt to avoid unmeritorious argumentation in litigation), it becomes long and 
cumbersome, thereby becoming too impenetrable to be used in any meaningful way in 
guiding conduct. The layperson will continue to refer to being ‘assaulted’ or ‘battered’, 
which inevitably undermines the point of an approach which is designed to promote the 
individuality of different kinds of injury. However, he cannot divide the different types of 
injury into separate offences because, by his own admission, “[t]here is no way of 
‘comparing’, say, the loss of a leg with blindness, with a view to deciding which is more or 
less serious.”377 There is a sense, then, that Horder wants to have his cake and eat it, 
because a judge will nevertheless create such comparisons over the course of deciding 
numerous cases on different kinds of injury all prosecuted under Horder’s proposed 
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offence.378 He therefore seeks to respect the uniqueness and moral content of different 
kinds of injury, but not in any meaningful way.   
 
4.4 Utilising the Conduct Axis 
 
Quite aside from the question of morality, however, there is something to be said 
for both Gardner and Horder’s reliance on this third conduct element in the structuring of 
assault definitions. They are correct to think that a structure based solely on culpability and 
resulting harm is ill equipped to adequately reflect the plethora of conduct that a principled 
assault offence would seek to cover. Hadden notes the arbitrariness of grading offences 
purely based on result, stating that in its “crudest form this involves the classification of 
crimes according to what is often a purely fortuitous event.”379 Indeed, the English 
experience is perhaps the most notorious example of a system which is focused on results 
to the point of being arbitrary, and of the approach it has been said that: “[a]ttempting to 
grade assaults on a scale of seriousness is inevitably a difficult and controversial 
exercise… Clearly the criminal law hierarchy of seriousness… was too crude to be of any 
utility.”380  
 
4.4.1 Legitimacy over Harm 
 
As a result, he recommends an alternative axis which liability could be based on: 
legitimacy. He argues that almost any survey on violent crime reveals the wide range of 
situations in which violence may occur, and that the present law does not do enough to 
give adequate recognition to this fact (essentially the current law of defences is 
inadequate). Legitimacy would seek to grade the situations in which harm occurs in a way 
that is more realistic than can be gleamed from a simple determination based on the mental 
element in isolation; he points out that an impulsive killing during a robbery might rightly 
be considered more blameworthy than the premeditated murder of an abuser in a domestic 
situation.381 He admits that it would be impractical to provide for every possible scenario 
and degree of legitimacy or illegitimacy in the law, and thus in most cases the assessment 
of the total situation would be left to the discretion of the court. But this, he argues, should 
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not prevent us from making specific provisions for those situations in which violence can 
rarely, if ever, be tolerated.382 
 
However, the concept of legitimacy is a curious one because, at its core, it seeks to 
include the facts of the case as part of the offence definition. In Hadden’s ideal world there 
would be an offence for every possible scenario, so that one might, for example, be 
charged with assaulting their partner while being a victim of domestic abuse and having 
first been physically assaulted by the abuser on a separate occasion. This is clearly 
untenable. It also undermines the (very valid) role of defences within our criminal legal 
system – defences are designed specifically to add a human element to what are otherwise 
bare model conduct rules. In the absence of such nuanced legal rules, requiring a jury to 
determine how much weight individual circumstances should add or detract from a given 
case is asking too much from a body of persons who too often have virtually no experience 
in the criminal justice process.383 
 
The Canadian Criminal Code (CCC) provides an example of a system based on a 
descriptive approach similar to Hadden’s concept of legitimacy – there are over sixteen 
individual offences for situations such as setting traps likely to cause harm, interference 
with transport facilities, assault, assault with a weapon or causing GBH, unlawfully 
causing GBH, assaulting a peace officer and disarming a peace officer.384 This seems 
unnecessarily convoluted. In the case of the latter two offences mentioned, it is unclear 
precisely what benefit is obtained (and to whom) from distinguishing the assault versus the 
disarmament of a peace officer. Likewise, the offence of assault causing GBH appears to 
be undermined by the fact that unlawfully causing GBH appears to cover the same conduct 
without the additional assault element, the maximum penalty for each being identical. The 
danger of proscribing in detail is that one inevitably over-proscribes and undermines the 
moral content that the law is supposed to represent. 
 
4.4.2 Motives as a Layering Function 
 
One quick point should be made in relation to the potential role of motives in any 
offence structure. English law permits offences against the person to be racially or 
                                                 
382 Ibid.  
383 For example, see SJ Schulhofer, “Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of 
Conduct in the Criminal Law” (1974) 122 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1497 at 1528.  
384 CCC §§247, 248, 265, 267, 269, 270 and 270.1 respectively.  
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religiously aggravated, which might even be seen as a different axis which an assault 
structure must consider. Structurally, this ‘aggravation’ is unorthodox in that the legislation 
creates separate mirror offences of both the common law and statutory crimes with the 
added offence element that the defender was hostile to the victim based on their race or 
religion (a fact which must be proved at trial).385 At first blush the creation of separate, 
more serious, offences implies the corresponding creation of extra rungs on the assault 
ladder, but the offences created are really just duplicates of pre-existing rungs, save that 
prejudicial motives will result in a harsher punishment. It therefore provides a layering 
function to the existing scheme, rather than a scaling function in the way that intentionality 
and infliction of harm are used. 
 
In theory, there is nothing to prevent a legal system from using such aggravations as 
an axis on which to scale their offences of violence, but there are strong arguments against 
using what essentially boils down to motives to determine criminal liability, one of the 
most convincing being that to do so moves away from an act-centred theory of criminal 
punishment to one based on character; i.e. one based on perfectionism.386 Further, the use 
of motives as an axis encounters the same problem as Hadden’s legitimacy axis – it would 
be impossible to give meaning to every motive within a workable structure.  
 
4.4.3 In Defence of Harm 
 
Hadden’s argument therefore represents a rejection of retributive justice theory, or 
punishment for harm caused (as opposed to what was intended by the accused). Even if we 
disagree with Hadden’s solution, he is certainly correct that a focus on harm presents a 
curious problem by differentiating offenders based on outcomes which they may have no 
control over. Nevertheless, this theory permeates many modern criminal legal systems, 
such as English law which Hadden was commenting on, but also the laws of several 
American States following the MPC law of assault.387 The American Law Institute (ALI) 
justifies their approach to this issue in the MPC by pointing out that “juries will not lightly 
find convictions that will lead to the severest types of sentences unless the resentments 
caused by the infliction of important injuries have been aroused.”388 Essentially, one should 
                                                 
385 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s28.  
386 HM Hurd, “Why Liberals Should Hate ‘Hate Crime Legislation’” (2001) 20 Law and Philosophy 215. 
387 New Hampshire, §§631:1-2 & 4; New Jersey, §2C:12-1; Pennsylvania, tit.18, §§2701-2702; South 
Dakota, §§22-18-1-1.1; and Vermont, tit.13, §§1023-1024.  
388 MPC §2.03, Comment at 1., p.257 in American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Part 
I (1985). 
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not adopt rules which will be overridden by juries (Schulhofer labels this phenomenon 
“jury nullification”)389 and so harsher penalties should be limited to cases where harm 
occurs.  
 
How important then, is a penalty structure based on harm to maintaining integrity 
in the law? Schulhofer suggests that a focus on retribution can be understood as a hangover 
of criminal law’s early role as an instrument of vengeance. The idea that an attempt was a 
crime in itself developed slowly.390 Thus, even today retribution remains a function of the 
criminal law, endorsed by the public in relation to many crimes despite the fact that it 
operates not dissimilar to a lottery, owing to its focus on distinctions based on fortuitous 
results. Schulhofer gives the example of two men shooting their wives, intending to kill; in 
one case the wife is miraculously saved. Is it fair to hold one more culpable than the 
other?391 This is precisely the case under the MPC, where reckless conduct creating a risk 
of serious injury is a misdemeanour if no harm occurs, but is a felony of the second degree 
if death occurs.392 Schulhofer points out that rules like this say, in effect, that the moral 
quality of an act is determined not only by factors within an actor’s knowledge and control, 
but also by unseen circumstances “by the invisible hand of Fate.”393 
 
Schulhofer suggests that the popular tolerance of an emphasis on harm caused is 
due to a failure to perceive that a lack of success in certain cases was due to fortuitous 
rather than relevant factors.394 It is precisely in the fortuitous nature of harm that one can 
nevertheless find justifications for its emphasis. The random nature associated with covert 
lottery systems such as harm can provide equal protection because everyone involved is 
given precisely the same chance.395 If the lottery in question serves the goals of 
administrative convenience and efficiency, then it gains rationality by virtue of being 
related to a legitimate state interest.396 We do not, however, have to pretend that grading 
based on harm is a perfect system – it might still be the best option where the alternatives 
would result in less effective deterrence (when the extra penalty for harm caused is 
removed) or greater severity (when the extra penalty is applied in all cases).397  
                                                 
389 Schulhofer, op cit. at 1522. 
390 Ibid at 1499. 
391 Ibid at 1515. 
392 Ibid at 1499; MPC §§211.1(1)(a), 211.2, 210.3.  
393 Ibid at 1516. 
394 Ibid at 1513.  
395 Ibid at 1565.  
396 Ibid.  
397 Ibid.  
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Further, within the specific context of assault harm as a grading factor is arguably 
not a completely arbitrary factor. We saw how rights in personality developed through the 
nineteenth century so that honour came to be regulated by defamation, and thus assault 
became a crime of violence. It is therefore hard to conceive of a law of assault where the 
structure is not based on harm caused by violence. To deny harm as an important factor of 
the crime is to essentially deny the quality which makes it unique in the first place.  
 
4.4.4 Utilising Conduct 
 
The MPC arguably avoids the issue of over-reliance on harm and culpability in 
their structure of assault by utilising a third, conduct axis to create a tiered approach to 
structuring assault. Horder alluded to utilising the mode of responsibility, but he was 
concerned with how this element could help give moral value to the law. Likewise, 
Gardner argued for a focus on the wrong committed rather than the harm, within a context 
which placed emphasis on its ability to improve the normative function of the law. We saw, 
however, the pitfalls of particularism and over-proscribing conduct, and how the moral 
function of the law could nevertheless be attained through offence headings rather than 
precise definitions.  
 
The MPC gives effect to this conduct axis in a different way, by providing several, 
separate methods by which ‘simple assault’ can be committed. A person commits the 
offence if he:  
 
a) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to 
another; or  
b) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or  
c) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily 
injury.398 
 
The ALI state that though the common law dealt with these wrongs separately, the 
categories of assault, battery, aggravated assault and mayhem had become so blurred that it 
better accords to modern understanding to treat them all under a single label.399 Of note, 
                                                 
398 MPC §211.1(1)(a)-(c). 
399 MPC §211.1, Part II, Comment at 1., pp.174-183.  
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the MPC structure does away with assault with intent offences, opting for modern grading 
of attempt according to the gravity of the underlying offence.400 Likewise, the MPC 
dispenses with grading based on the status of the victim, on the basis of the ample severity 
of the general penalties against attacks upon a person, regardless of their identity.401  
 
The added conduct element allows the MPC to criminalise broad headings of 
conduct, while maintaining both the moral efficacy of the ‘assault’ offence heading, and 
the individual nature of the different forms of conduct. Utilising this structural method, 
Scots law could better outline the conduct which forms assault, while also dealing with 
more nuanced issues. For example, an assault structure which provides different methods 
of completion could allow for a category of minor assaults which would be vitiated by 
consent, while excluding consent from other, more serious, infringements of physical 
integrity which the law feels consent should not be capable of mitigating.402 Likewise, 
Scots law might avoid the issues created by cases like Ireland and Burstow403 in relation to 
psychiatric injury by creating a separate offence with a suitable offence heading, such as 
‘psychiatric trauma’. This might include lesser threats which currently exist under the 
heading of assault, creating a clear division between physical and mental attacks within the 
offences against the person framework.404 
 
At a more general level, this new offence of assault should be used to separate and 
(therefore) simplify the current modes of commission for an attack on a person. Each mode 
could be subject to separate maximum sentences, to provide greater clarity on the relative 
severity of each method. Thus, an assault might be carried out as a basic attack, with a 
weapon, or on a specific class of person. Where the harm caused was more severe, a 
separate offence of ‘serious assault’ could outline similar modes, but with greater 
maximum penalties to reflect the severity of the harm. 
 
 
 
                                                 
400 Ibid at p.183; see also §5.05(1) and Commentary, Part I, pp.484-492. 
401 Ibid at p.185.  
402 This category may nevertheless be quite small, and limited to conduct of a more sexual nature: Smart v 
HM Advocate 1975 JC 30 (no defence of consent to a ‘square go’); R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 (consent to 
homosexual sadomasochistic activities no defence); cf. R v Wilson [1996] 3 WLR 125 (consent provided 
acquittal in case of branding flesh). See also the Scottish Draft Criminal Code, s111.  
403 R v Ireland; R v Burstow [1998] AC 147.  
404 On this point, see generally P Alldridge, “Threats Offences – A Case for Reform” [1994] Crim LR 176. 
Cf. J Horder, “Reconsidering Psychic Assault” [1998] Crim LR 392.   
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to understand the structure of assault in Scots law from both 
historical and, subsequently, comparative perspectives. Inclusion of a historical account 
served two aims: first, a detailed, chronological account of the history of assault in 
Scotland served to add to an area of the literature which was previously lacking; and 
second, an analysis of the historical sources has enabled us to trace the development of 
assault as a nominate crime and determine how this sequence has impacted on the shape of 
assault as a crime today.  
 
In chapter one we examined the period from the mid-seventeenth to mid-eighteenth 
centuries, focusing on the writings of Sir George Mackenzie, William Forbes and Sir 
Alexander Bayne to supplement the sporadic case law reports that emerged during this 
time. We saw how breaches of physical integrity were fragmented and treated under two, 
separate offences. Serious injuries were undoubtedly crimes of violence, and appropriately 
titled ‘mayhem’. By contrast, minor injuries were treated as ‘injuries’, a concept which had 
been transplanted from the Romans as part of the ius commune legal tradition upon which 
Scots law was heavily influenced.  
 
‘Injuries’ themselves were sub-divided into two categories, those which were 
‘verbal’ or ‘real’. Verbal injuries corresponded to what we now understand as the (civil) 
law of defamation, whereas real injuries criminalised any outward conduct (including 
actions not carried out on the body of another) which would amount to a similar kind of 
defamation, minor physical injuries included.  Thus, some physical injuries were crimes of 
violence, whereas others were crimes of reputation. There was very little discussion of 
culpability in the seventeenth century, and thus it was often taken for granted that if the 
conduct was carried out then liability should follow. Mackenzie reveals that intention was a 
prerequisite for verbal injuries, whereas Forbes suggests that this was the case for injuries 
generally. Other than a distinction between serious and minor injuries, all other factors 
which we would today label ‘aggravations’ were treated as sentencing guidelines to be 
considered by the judge.  
 
In chapter two we explored the transitional period leading up to the revolutionary 
work of Baron David Hume. We saw how ‘assault’ emerged as a nomen juris to categorise 
various ways one could attack another person, both directly and indirectly. This notion of 
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‘attack’ was solidified by the emergence of stellionatus (subsequently real injury) as an 
alternative libel for conduct which could not, on a natural interpretation, be considered an 
overt attack. The development of assault as a nominate term caused mayhem to be merged 
with other, lesser forms of attack, and thus for the first time real injuries became a crime of 
violence. Meanwhile, aggravating conduct became more structured and coherent, 
representing a focus on grading harsher assaults in terms of the resulting harm they caused, 
so that injuries to the danger of life (and mayhem, as discussed above) were now 
considered more serious forms of assault. Once again this period saw minimal discussion 
about culpability requirements, but there was nevertheless still an emphasis on intention, 
and the courts were willing to find constructive intention in cases where the violence was 
indirect.  
 
Chapter three sought to briefly summarise the developments from the mid-
nineteenth century and the current law of assault. There was a further move towards a more 
cohesive understanding of aggravations as the method by which Scots law graded the 
offence in terms of harm caused. Culpability requirements became explicit, and the modern 
law of assault requires the accused to intend to attack. An absence of this intention will 
mean either that there is no liability, or only liability on some other grounds (e.g. reckless 
injury). The foundation of assault in iniuria can be said to have played a part in this 
requirement, as injuries generally were understood in the context of defamation, which 
requires the accused to have intended to harm the reputation of another. This stricter 
culpability requirement represents the fact that criminal liability for slanderous remarks 
was, understandably, higher.  
 
Finally, chapter four considered the two conventional axes on which assault can be 
varied: culpability and resulting harm. It was argued that the current culpability 
requirement, despite the apparent lack of historical development, was advantageous due to 
our natural understanding of the word ‘assault’ and the fact that a distinction based on 
culpability allowed for some element of grading which helps to satisfy the principle of fair 
labelling.  
 
Variation and grading based on harm was then considered at some length in the 
context of the English experience. The problems with the current English law were 
outlined along with the Law Commission’s proposals for reform. It was argued that the 
criticisms based on an apparent lack of moral content in the Law Commission proposals 
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were misguided, although they bore out that one could not only look to the harm and 
culpability when assessing crime, both in a specific moral sense, and equally in a wider 
discussion of criminal law generally. Rather, one must consider the wrong holistically, 
through a third, separate axis of conduct or mode of application.  
This involved a brief analysis of the approach taken to the conduct axis in the US 
with the MPC assault provisions, which allows the crime of ‘simple assault’ to be 
committed in several ways. It was argued that such an approach could allow for nuances in 
the law of offences against the person to be borne out, namely that consent could be 
considered in an isolated fashion, rather than as something broad that had to be considered 
in every case of assault. Likewise, this approach could lead to greater and more fulfilling 
distinctions in the harm caused, and in how we treat mental, rather than physical, attacks. It 
is hoped that a structure similar to that of the MPC can be adopted, taking account of the 
peculiarities of Scots law, to provide a more principled approach to this important offence 
in our criminal law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
Bibliography 
Books 
Alison A, Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland (1832)(Butterworths: Law Society of 
Scotland, 1989) 
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries: Official Draft and Revised 
Commentaries, Parts I & II (Philadelphia, P: American Law Institute, 1980-1985) 
Anderson AM, The Criminal Law of Scotland (Sweet & Maxwell, 1892) 
Ashworth A & Horder J, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 7th edn, 
2013) 
Bayne A, Institutions of the Criminal Law of Scotland. For the use of students who attend 
the lectures of Alexander Bayne, J.P. (1730) (Gale ECCO, 2011) 
Berlichius M, Pars Conclusionum Practicabilium (Leipzig, Jena, 1651) 
Birks P, McLeod G, Krueger P, Justinian’s Institutes (Duckworth, 1987) 
Burchell J, Principles of Criminal Law (Claremont: Juta, 4th ed, 2014) 
Cameron J (ed), The Justiciary Records of Argyll and the Isles 1664-1705, Vol I (Stair 
Society, 1949) 
Donaldson G, Scotland: James V to James VII (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1965) 
Farmer L, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order (Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 
Forbes W, The Institutes of the Law of Scotland (1730) (Edinburgh Legal Education Trust, 
2012) 
Forbes W, A Great Body of the Law of Scotland, available at 
http://www.forbes.gla.ac.uk/contents/ 
Gordon G, Criminal Law of Scotland, Volume II (Chalmers J & Leverick F (eds))(4th edn, 
W Green, 2016) 
Hume D, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, Respecting Crimes (1797) (Edinburgh: 
Law Society of Scotland, 1986) 
Lord Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights: With Observations 
upon the Agreement or Diversity Between them and the Laws of England (1751)(Stair 
Society, 1993) 
Lord Cooper of Culross, Selected Papers 1920-1955 (Edinburgh, 1957) 
Macdonald JHA, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland (W Green, 5th edn, 
1948) 
Mackenzie G, Institutions of the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh, 2nd edn, 1688) 
87 
 
Mackenzie G, The Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal (1678) (OF 
Robinson (ed) 2012, Vol. 59, The Stair Society) 
Mackenzie G, The Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal (Edinburgh, 2nd edn, 
1699), Appendix on Mutilation and Demembration by Sir Alexander Seton of Pitmedden 
Robinson OF, The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome (Duckworth, 1995) 
Smith JI, Selected Justiciary Cases 1624-1650 Vol. II (Stair Society, 1972) 
Smith TB, British Justice: The Scottish Contribution (London: Stevens, 1961) 
Stephen JF, A History of the Criminal Law of England (London: Macmillan, 1883) 
Walker DM, A Legal History of Scotland, Volume IV (T&T Clark, 1996) 
Walker DM, A Legal History of Scotland, Volume V (T&T Clark, 1998) 
Walker DM, A Legal History of Scotland, Volume VI (Butterworths, 2001) 
Walker DM, A Legal History of Scotland, Volume VII (Lexis Nexis, 2004) 
Walker DM, The Scottish Jurists (W Green, 1985) 
Walton FP (ed), Lord Hermand’s Consistorial Decisions 1684-1777 (1940) (Stair Society, 
Vol. 6) 
Watson A, The Digest of Justinian (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998) 
 
Chapters in Books of Collected Essays 
Blackie J, “Defamation” in K Reid & R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in 
Scotland, Vol 2 (Oxford University Press, 2000) pp.633-707 
Blackie J, “Unity in Diversity: The History of Personality Rights in Scots Law” in N 
Whitty & R Zimmermann (eds), Rights in Personality in Scots Law (Dundee University 
Press, 2009) pp.31-146 
Chalmers J, “Offences Against the Person” in The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, MD 
Dubber & T Hörnle (eds) (Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. 727-746 
Lord Hope of Craighead, “The strange habits of the English” in HL MacQueen (ed), 
Miscellany Six by Various Authors (The Stair Society, 2009) pp.309-320 
Robinson OF, “Law, Morality and Sir George Mackenzie” in HL MacQueen (ed), 
Miscellany Six (Stair Society, 2009) pp.11-27 
Journal Articles 
Alldridge P, “Threats Offences – A Case for Reform” [1994] Criminal Law Review 176 
Birks P, “Harassment and hubris: the right to an equality of respect” (1997) 32 Irish Jurist 
1  
Cairns J, “John Millar’s lectures on Scots criminal law” (1988) 8 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 364 
88 
 
Chalmers J & Leverick F, “Fair Labelling in Criminal Law” (2008) 71 Modern Law 
Review 217 
Clarkson CMV, Cretney AL, Davis GC and Shepherd J, “Assaults: The relationship 
between seriousness, criminalisation and punishment” [1994] Criminal Law Review 4 
Daube D, “The Self-Understood in Legal History” 1973 Juridical Review 126 
Francis B, Soothill K & Dittrich R, “A New Approach for Ranking ‘Serious’ Offences: The 
Use of Paired-Comparisons Methodology” (2001) 41 The British Journal of Criminology 
726 
Gardner J, “Rationality and the Rule of Law in Offences Against the Person” (1994) 53 
Cambridge Law Journal 502 
Gibson M, “Getting their ‘Act’ Together? Implementing Statutory Reform of Offences 
against the Person” [2016] Criminal Law Review 597 
Hadden T, “Offences of Violence: The Law and the Facts” [1968] Criminal Law Review 
521 
Horder J, “A Critique of the Correspondence Principle” [1995] Criminal Law Review 759 
Horder J, “Reconsidering Psychic Assault” [1998] Criminal Law Review 392 
Horder J, “Rethinking Non-fatal Offences against the Person” (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 335 
Hurd HM, “Why Liberals Should Hate ‘Hate Crime Legislation’” (2001) 20 Law and 
Philosophy 215 
Schreiber J, Williams A, Ranson D, “Kings to Cowards: One-punch Assaults” (2016) 44(2) 
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 332 
Schulhofer SJ, “Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct 
in the Criminal Law” (1974) 122 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1497 
Von Hirsch A & Jareborg N, “Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis” 
(1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 
Wasser M, “Defence counsel in early modern Scotland: A study based on the High Court of 
Justiciary” (2005) 26 Journal of Legal History 183 
 
United Kingdom Publications and Resources 
Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC), Fourteenth Report: Offences against the 
Person (1980) Cmd.7844 
Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law: A Report to the Law Commission 
(1985) Law Com No 143 
89 
 
Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales (2 Vols) (1989) Law Com No 
177 
Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against the Person and 
General Principles (1992) Law Com C.P.122 
Law Commission, Offences against the Person and General Principles (1993) Law Com 
No 218 
Law Commission, Consent and Offences Against the Person (1994) Law Com C.P.134 
Law Commission, Offences against the Person Scoping Consultation (2014) Law Com 
C.P.217 
Law Commission, Reform of Offences against the Person (2015) Law Com No 361 
The Scottish Government, Scottish Crime and Justice Survey 2014/15: Main Findings 
(March 2016) 
Scottish Law Commission, A Draft Criminal Code for Scotland with Commentary (2003) 
 
UK Cases 
Affleck v Gordon (1755) Mor 7348 
Alex Macdonald and John Fraser (1818) Hume, i, 318 
Alexander Arbuthnot of Knox v Straiton of Laureston (1677) 3 Bro. Sup. 209 
Archibald, Earl of Forfar v John Gilhagie (1712) Mor. 7820 
Argyll v Mr John Stewart (1641) 2 JC 423 
Atkins v London Weekend Television Ltd 1978 JC 48 
Atkinson v HM Advocate 1987 SCCR 534 
Benjamin Ross (1824), Alison, i, 197 
Brown v Alexander (1757) Hume, i, 443 
Buchan & Hossack, 22 July 1840, Bell’s Notes 90 
Campbell (1678) 1 Justiciary Records of Argyll and the Isles 134 (case 60) 
Captain Andrew Nairne (1712) Hume, i, 442 
Carnagie (1672): Scott-Moncrieff, Justiciary Records, vol 2, 116 at pp.120-121 
Chene (1602) II Pitcairn, 399 
Cheynes v Mowat and Ors (1641) 2 JC 463 
Cochran (1717) Renfrewshire Sheriff Court 215 
Colqhoun (1694) 2 Justiciary Records of Argyll and the Isles 60 (case 95) 
Crombie (1638) 1 JC 290 
David Barnet and John Brown (1820), Hume, i, 326 
David Robertson Williamson (1853) 1 Irv 244 
Dennis Connor and Edward Morrison (1848) J Shaw 5 
DPP v K [1990] 1 WLR 1067 
DPP v Little (1992) 95 Cr App R 28 
Ewing v Earl of Mar (1851) 14 D. 314 
Ferguson and Eadie, Perth, 22 April (1822), Hume, Chapter VI, 3, p.237, b. 
Findlater and McDougall (1841) 2 Swin 527 
Forbes (1626) 1 JC 44 
Forrest v Crichton 12 Dec. 1807 FC 
Gilmour v McGlennan 1993 SCCR 837 
Grahame (1603) II Pitcairn, 416 
90 
 
Haliburton (1640) 2 JC 389 
Hamilton (1628) 1 JC 82 
Hamilton v Blair (1724): Hector, Renfrewshire Sheriff Court 105 
Hendersone (1609) III Pitcairn, 58 
HM Advocate v Forbes 1994 JC 71 
HM Advocate v Harris 1993 JC 150 
HMA v Lord Balmerino (1634) 3 Cobbett’s State Trials 591; (1634) 1 JC 230 
HM Advocate v Phipps (1905) 4 Adam 616 
Howison (1643) 3 JC 578 
Howitt v HM Advocate 2000 SLT 449 
Hyslop v Staig 1 Mur 15 
James Alves (1830) 5 D. & A. 147 
James Cairns (1837) 1 Swin. 597 
James Gordon of Davach v William Duff of Dipple (1707) Mor. 1078 
James Reid(Gray) (1640) 2 JC 387 
James Scrymgeuer (1619) Pitcairn III, 467 State Trials 591 
John Barr (1839) 2 Swin. 282 
John Beatson (1836) 1 Swin. 254 
John McArthur (1830) Shaw 216 and Bell’s Notes 84 
John Rogers (1641) 2 JC 505 
John Shaw, Glasgow, (1823), Alison, i, 182; 197 
Johnnestoune (1605) II Pitcairn, 461 
Keay (1837) 1 Swinton 543 
Kepple v HM Advocate 1936 SLT 294 
Kennedy v Young (1854) 1 Irv. 533 
Khaliq v HM Advocate 1984 JC 23 
Lady Dun v Campbell, 22 November (1714), Hume, i, 332 
Lang v Little (1826) 4 Mur. 82 
Leith of Newleslie (1648) 3 JC 795 
Lord Ochiltree (1631) 1 JC 176 
Lord Advocate's Reference (No. 2 of 1992) 1993 JC 43 
MacDonnell v McDonald (1813) 2 Dow 66 
Macnaughton v Robertson 17 February 1809 FC 
Maxwell (1605) II Pitcairn, 464 
McDonald and Dustan (1872) 2 Couper 174 
McLauchlan v Monach (1823) 2 S 590 
Milne and Barry (1868) 1 Couper 28 
Mitchell, Aberdeen, April 1833, Bell’s Notes 90 
Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421 
Neil Macilroy, 21 November (1825), Alison, i, 182 
Nelson v HM Advocate 1994 SCCR 192 
Ogilvie & Ogilvie, Perth, 14 April 1830, Bell’s Notes 89 
Patrick Martin and Ors, (1647) 3 JC 759 
Peter Leys (1839) 2 Swin 337 
Peter White, Perth, 1827, Alison, i, 182 
Principal Reporter v N 2014 GWD 30-592 
Procurator Fiscal of Edinburgh v Hog, February 6, 1831, Alison, i, 175 
Quinn v Lees 1994 SCCR 159 
R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 
R v Ireland; R v Burstow [1998] AC 147 
R v Venna [1976] QB 421 
R v Wilson [1996] 3 WLR 125 
Richmond v Thomson (1838) 16 S. 995 
91 
 
Robert Angus (1640) 2 JC 396 
Robert Brown and John Lawson (1842) 1 Broun 415; Bell’s Notes 90 
Robert Butter, 7 December 1829, Alison, i, 182 
Robert Charlton (1831) Bell’s Notes 89 
Roy (1839) Bell’s Notes, 88 
Savage [1991] 3 WLR 914 
Scott (1649) 3 JC 810 
Smart v HM Advocate 1975 JC 30 
Stewart of Ryland (1643) 3 JC 588 
Symsone and Cleuch (1640) 2 JC 392 
Trail of Deacon Brodie: available at 
https://archive.org/stream/trialofdeaconbro00brod/trialofdeaconbro00brod_djvu.txt.  
Tullis v Glenday (1834) Sc Jur 503 
Ulhaq v HM Advocate 1991 SLT 614 
Walker v HM Advocate 2014 JC 154 
Walter Blair (1844) 2 Broun 167 
Walter Duthrie Ure (1858) 3 Irvine 10 
Walter Morison (1842) 1 Broun 394 
William Fraser (1847) Ark. 280 
William Irvine of Gribtown, 29 December 1718 & 9 January 1719, Hume, I, 332 
Williamson v HM Advocate 1984 SLT 200 
Young (1642) 2 JC 529 
 
International Cases 
Wellons v State, 77 Ga. App. 652, 48 S.E.2d 922 (1948) 
 
United Kingdom Statutes and Statutes of the Scottish Parliament 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 
Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 
Police (Scotland) Act 1967 
 
International Legislation  
Crimes Act 1990 (ACT) 
Crimes Act 1990 (NSW) 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) 
Criminal Code Act 2002 (ACT) 
Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) 
Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) 
Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) 
Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) 
Criminal Code R.S.C, 1985, c. C-46 (Canada) 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (South Australia) 
92 
 
New Hampshire Revised Statutes (2015) – Title LXII – Criminal Code 
New Jersey Revised Statutes (2013) – The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice 
Pennsylvania, Consolidated Statutes, Title 18 – Crimes and Offences 
South Dakota, Codified Laws, Title 22 – Crimes 
Vermont Statutes, Title 13 – Crimes and Criminal Procedure  
